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The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals:
A Modest Critique of Appellate
Decisionmaking
J Thomas Sullivan*
Lawyers must understand the court's attitude toward the law as
well as the substantive content of its decisions in order to advise cli-
ents. To accurately predict how the court will decide a given case a
lawyer must be able to anticipate the directions in which the court is
moving.
This paper offers a look from the standpoint of a defense lawyer
at the performance of the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals, the state
court of last resort in criminal appellate matters. This study focuses
on decisions which are at least arguably wrong. The point, however,
is not mere disagreement with the court's results, but an analysis of
the technique which led the court astray. The aim of this approach
is to shed light on the court's reasoning and mode of operation, not
to attack the substantive basis for the court's ruling.'
By statute,' the Court of Criminal Appeals is required to pro-
vide a written opinion or explanation of its decisions. Only a small
number of these opinions, however, are published in the national
reporter system. By rule of the court, unpublished opinions are not
deemed, or cited as, precedent.3 Most studies of the court's work do
not include unpublished opinions, but because of the insight they
provide into why cases succeed or fail on appeal, this study refers to
them.
* J.D., SMU; Member, Texas Bar.
1. Alternative approaches to the study of performance of the Court of Criminal Appeals
would have equal or greater validity, of course. For example, social science methodology
could be applied to overall disposition rates in the Court, comparing rates of rever-
sal/affirmance based upon: type of offense; whether the offense reviewed was one of violence
or non-violence; whether the accused was represented by appointed or retained counsel on
appeal; whether the accused was free on bail or incarcerated during the time of the appeal, etc.
A novel approach might be to follow cases through affirmance by the Court and into the
federal courts to determine the extent to which federal judges tend to overrule the elected
judges of the Court of Criminal Appeals, particularly with respect to disposition of an individ-
ual ground of error-e.g., improper final argument by the prosecution-or with respect to a
given category of offense, such as death penalty cases.
2. TEx. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 44.24(c) (Vernon 1979).
3. Tex Rules of Post Trial and Appellate Procedure in a Criminal Case 308(b), 1981.
AM. J. CRIM. LAW
The following principles provide a framework for analyzing ap-
pellate decisions.4 First, an appellate court bears the responsibility
to protect the constitutional interests of the individual, while also
preserving legislative enactments wherever possible.' Second, the
court must apply rules of law without concern for political expedi-
ency or unpopularity of result.6 Third, the court should not apply its
decisions retroactively to the detriment of an individual accused. 7
Fourth, the lower appellate courts must give full effect to decisions of
higher appellate courts.8 Fifth, the court should directly address is-
sues to give effect to individual rights and to provide notice of what
activity is proscribed by law.9 Sixth, the courts must afford the ac-
cused access to appellate review in order to provide a means for fair
litigation of claims.' 0 Seventh, it is of paramount importance that
the court treat factually similar cases consistently. These principles
represent concepts a defense attorney must work with in counseling
clients.
Each section of this paper focuses on an area where the Court of
Criminal Appeals has failed to apply the principles set out above in
rendering its decisions. For the most part, the results themselves are
not particularly offensive, but the process employed by the court in
reaching its results is not based on sound decisionmaking principles.
I.
Defense Counsel rely on the willingness of an appellate court to
void unconstitutional legislative enactments which improperly in-
4. L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW, 82 (1964):
All of the influences that can produce a lack of congruence between judicial action
and statutory law can, when the court itself makes the law, produce equally damag-
ing departures from other principles of equality: a failure to articulate reasonably
clear general rules and an inconstancy in decision manifesting itself in contradictory
rules, frequent changes of direction, and retrospective changes in the law.
5. In National Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corporation, 301 U.S.
1, 30 (1937), Chief Justice Hughes wrote:
We have repeatedly held that as between two possible interpretations of a statute, by
one of which it would be unconstitutional and the other valid, our plain duty is to
adopt that which will save the act. Even to avoid a serious doubt the rule is the same.
6. See generall,, L. FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
7. Fuller, supra note 4.
8. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 611 F.2d 132, 133 (5th Cir.
1980), opinion of Gee, J., on remand from the Supreme Court:
For myself only, and with all respect and deference, I here note my personal convic-
tion that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case is profoundly wrong.
9. Fuller, supra note 4.
10. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963) (denial of counsel on appeal); Griffin v.
Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
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fringe upon liberties guaranteed by the federal or state constitutions.
The proper exercise of discretion by an appellate court requires the
court to uphold legislative enactments as the proper expression of the
will of the people, provided the enactments can be construed consist-
ently with constitutional limitations on the powers of government.1
When an appellate court fails to void an improper act, the judicial
system fails to provide the check on legislative power contemplated
by the separation of powers concept.
An elected judge may deem it politically unwise to interfere
with legislation enacted by the representative body,' 2 particularly if
the measure can be characterized as "anti-crime" in nature. In at
least two recent instances the Court of Criminal Appeals has devi-
ated from the principle that the judiciary should protect individual
rights granted by constitutional provisions against legislative in-
fringement. In Exparte Hufflhines,"3 Judge Onion presided over a
panel of the court which expressly recognized that the legislatively
created procedure for asserting double jeopardy claims was defec-
tive, yet failed to take action to either void the legislative enactment
or to create an alternative procedure.
Huffhines was convicted of the offense of unlawful possession of
11. One of the critical questions regarding appellate judicial behavior is to what extent
courts should intervene to nullify actions of the legislature. The debate has often focused on
the United States Supreme Court and is characterized by differing views on the role of the
Court as expressed by the Justices themselves. For example: "The Court's essential function is
to act as the final arbiter of minority rights," Chief Justice Warren, The Philadelphia Inquirer,
October 4, 1978, p. 2.
Justice Robert Jackson wrote in his volume, The Supreme Court in the American System of
Government, 23 (1955):
The people have seemed to feel that the Supreme Court, whatever its defects, is still
the most detached, dispassionate, and trustworthy custodian that our system affords
for the translation of abstract into concrete constitutional commands.
Yet, others on the Court have resisted the tendency to intervene in activity where the legisla-
ture has acted. Consider, for example, the discussion of Justice Felix Frankfurter's views in
Anthony Lewis, Gideon'r Trumpet, 82-83 (1964).
12. On the election of judges, consider the following note from Abraham, The Judiciary:
The Supreme Court in the Governmefital Process, 147 n. I (1977):
Chief Justice Roger J. Traynor of the California Supreme Court told a judicial con-
ference in the fall of 1970 that the "greatest single improvement that could be made
in the administration of this country would be to get rid of the popular election of
judges." (The New York Times, October 5 1970, p. 34.) At that time fully 82 per cent
of the judges on local and state courts were elected. (Ibid) That figure has dropped
but slightly since.
13. Exparte Huhines, # 60, 749-60, 751 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), one opinion, unpub-
lished (hereinafter Huffjhines). Other members of the panel serving with Presiding Judge
Onion were Judges Roberts and Clinton.
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a firearm silencer.'4 He gave notice of appeal and his counsel filed
an appellate brief in his behalf. Pursuant to his statutory authority,' 5
the trial judge reviewed the briefs of the parties and ordered that
Huffhines be granted a new trial. The trial court then set the cause
for trial.
Hufhines, however, interposed a double jeopardy claim by
filing an application for writ of habeas corpus 6 alleging, inter alia,
that the evidence was insufficient to support conviction in the first
trial. He argued that the state was barred from further prosecution
by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court in Burks v.
United States 7 and Greene v. Massey. i" The trial court issued the
writ and conducted a hearing, but denied the requested relief. Huff-
hines then appealed the denial of relief to the Court of Criminal
Appeals. 19
The court denied the petitioner's requested relief on appeal. In
reaching its conclusion, the panel determined that it could not reach
the merits of his claim because the legislature had provided only one
means by which a claim of prior jeopardy could be litigated.20 The
defensive plea authorized by the legislature2' requires that the ac-
cused raise his claim of prior jeopardy as a pre-trial motion in ad-
vance of retrial.22 Once raised, the plea is heard by the trial court
and the decision is appealed, if necessary, in the appeal taken from
the subsequent conviction, if any.
23
The Court recognized that claims of prior jeopardy fall within
the particular constitutional guarantees of the Fifth Amendment24
14. Section 46.06(a)(4), Texas Penal Code, defines the offense of possession of a firearms
silencer, a second degree felony under Subsection (e).
15. Article 40.09, Section 12, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure provides:
It shall be the duty of the trial court to decide from the briefs and oral argument, if
any, whether the defendant should be granted a new trial by the trial court.
16. Although the Court noted the constitutional authority of the writ of habeas corpus as
a writ of "right," under Article I, Section 12, Texas Constitution, the review was conducted as
though the writ had been brought pursuant to the provisions of Article 11.07, Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure, which governs post-convictions remedies.
17. Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
18. Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
19. Appeal from denial of relief sought by writ of habeas corpus is authorized by two
sections, Article 11.07, Section 3, and Article 44.34 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
20. Iluffines, at 6-7.
21. Article 27.05, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
22. Article 27.02(2), Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
23. Article 27, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.
24. U.S. Const. amend. V. The Amendment provides, in pertinent part: ... nor shall
any person be subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb...."
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and article 1, section 14, of the Texas Constitution." It also recog-
nized that the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment has
been defined by the Supreme Court to not only preclude a second
conviction for a given offense, but a second trial as well. Quoting
from the opinion of Chief Justice Burger inAbney v. United States,26
the Court emphasized the Chief Justice's comment:27
Finally, the rights conferred on a criminal accused by the
Double Jeopardy Clause would be significantly under-
mined if appellate review of double jeopardy claims were
postponed until after conviction and sentence. To be sure,
the Double Jeopardy Clause protects an individual against
being twice convicted for the same crime, and that aspect of
the right can be fully vindicated on an appeal following
final judgment, as the Government suggests. However, this
Court has long recognized that the Double Jeopardy
Clause protects an individual against more than being sub-
jected to double punishments. It is a guarantee against be-
ing twice put to trial for the same offense.28
Yet, despite the emphasis Abney 29 placed upon "being twice put to
trial" as a critical element of double jeopardy protection,30 the panel
concluded that the Texas Legislature had resolved the matter by re-
quiring that an accused plead prior jeopardy as a matter to be liti-
gated in the second trial.31 The practical impact of the procedure is
to delay any appellate consideration of the double jeopardy claim
until the appeal from a subsequent conviction.
In rejecting the use of the writ of habeas corpus as a means of
raising a prior jeopardy claim, the panel observed:
Were we writing on a clean slate, as well as the ration-
ale of the Supreme Court inAbney, supra, other cogent pol-
25. Tex. Const., art. I, § 14, provides:
No person, for the same offense shall be twice put in jeopardy of life or liberty,
nor shall a person again be put on trial for the same offense, after a verdict of not
guilty in a court of competent jurisdiction.
The Texas Double Jeopardy guarantee expressly provides a greater coverage for the ac-
cused than that included in the language of the Fifth Amendment in that the Clause proscribes
a second trial after verdict of acquittal.
26. Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
27. Hujhines, at 6.
28. 437 U.S. 660-663.
29. 473 U.S. 660-663.
30. U.S. Const., amend. V.
31. Hujhines, at 7, citing and quoting from Exparte Crofford, 47 S.W. 533 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1898):
This is not a novel question in Texas. Since the case of Perry v. State, 41 Tex.
488, the decisions have been uniform that the writ of habeas corpus cannot be re-
sorted to for the purpose of discharging an appellant on a plea of former jeopardy.
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icy considerations might impel us to formulate a bar to
exposure to jeopardy through a second trial.
32
The other "cogent policy considerations" noted by the court in-
cluded reducing pressures on the judicial and penal systems by
avoiding lengthy trials which might be rendered unnecessary by pre-
trial determination of a prior jeopardy claim.33 The panel also noted
that the Abney rationale34 took into consideration the mental and
financial strain imposed on an individual required to undergo a sec-
ond rial before the prior jeopardy claim can be disposed of on
appeal.
Despite the constitutional reasoning relied on in Abney36 and
the "cogent policy considerations" cited by the panel,37 the Court
refused to authorize litigation of prior jeopardy claims by writ of
habeas corpus.38 The court instead referred to the "settled practice"
in Texas of litigating these issues by defensive plea raised in advance
of the second trial.39 The panel concluded:
Bound as we are by an unwavering line of precedent, yet
straining against the binds, we must nevertheless hold that
the issue of former jeopardy may neither be raised by peti-
tioner nor decided by this Court on application for writ of
habeas corpus.40
The panel further noted that its hesitance to approve the use of the
writ for litigating prior jeopardy issues in Huffhines was based in
part on certain inadequacies in the appellate record.4" The entire
court rejected further review in denying the petitioner/appellant
leave to file his motion for rehearing.
The problem posed for defense counsel by the Hufflines deci-
32. Id at 6-7.
33. Id at 6-7, especially n.8.
34. 431 U.S. 662.
35. Hujlhines, at 7.
36. 431 U.S. 662.
37. Huffines, at 7, n.8:
One can immediately conceive of many economies in the criminal justice system
that would be effectuated in utilizing the expeditious habeas corpus proceedings in
deciding the single question of jeopardy in advance of what surely would be an
otherwise lengthy trial that may very well produce many other claimed errors, along
with the attendant demand on the energies of court, jail and law enforcement person-
nel that might ultimately prove to have been wastefully expended.
The Court's emphasis in the preceding note is placed not on the protection of the rights of
the accused, but on tensions within the criminal justice system exacerbated by archaic pleading
requirements.
38. Hu§hines, at 8.
39. Id at 7.
40. Id at 7-8.
41. Id at 8.
Vol. 10: 113 (1982)
Appellate Decisionmaking
sion is that the court appears unwilling to enforce protected rights
when the legislature has taken an improper position.42 The panel
perhaps correctly sensed that the special plea procedure could with-
stand constitutional scrutiny43 and thus exercises sound discretion in
refusing to void an otherwise sound legislative enactment.44 How-
ever, in light of the state's constitutional protection of the accused's
interest against multiple prosecution,45 the panel's reluctance to rec-
ognize an alternative to the special plea is questionable.
The Texas Constitution provides that an accused is not to be
tried for the same offense once he has been acquitted of the charge.
Thus, if federal constitutional protections mandate that a conviction
not supported by sufficient evidence must be reversed and followed
by a verdict of acquittal-as Greene v. Massey46 provides-then the
Texas provision arguably protects an accused from a second trial
when he raises a legitimate claim that his first conviction is not sup-
ported by sufficient evidence. The panel decision, leaving intact the
special plea procedure as the only vehicle for raising a claim of prior
jeopardy, fails to recognize that the Texas Constitution provides
broader protection of the accused's rights than does the fifth
amendment.47
The Huffhines court would not have had to void the legislatively
created special plea in order to give full effect to the Abney concept
embraced in the decision. The panel could simply have recognized
an alternative to the special plea, the writ of habeas corpus, as a
means of raising a prior jeopardy claim when the issue is a claim of
42. Lewis, supra, note 1, at 83.
Justice (Hugo) Black ... has emphasized the duty of judges to preserve individual
liberty, and has argued that excessive deference to other branches of government
amounts to abdication of that responsibility. In the Black view, the framers of the
Constitution made the decision to protect individuals from governmental repression,
so a judge should not feel timid or self-conscious about doing so.
43. The Supreme Court dismissed an appeal for want of substantial federal question in
which appellant specifically attacked the special plea procedure in Reed v. Texas, 344 U.S. 851
(1981).
44. "Judicial self-restraint" is defined by Smith and Zurcher, Dictionary ofAmerican Poli-
tics, Barnes and Noble (1968), as:
The tendency of some judges to interpret narrowly the power ofjudicial review, as by
holding that changes in the law to achieve social goals is a responsibility of the legis-
lative and executive departments; and by questioning and even opposing the transfer
of functions from the States to the federal government. As typified by Justices
Holmes and Frankfurter, they are inclined to express doubts as to judicial
infallibility.
45. Tex. Const., art. I, § 14.
46. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
47. Compare notes 24 and 25.
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insufficient evidence in the first trial.48
While the special plea has withstood constitutional attack thus
far, the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has recognized the right of an
accused to seek relief by way of federal habeas corpus once attempts
to gain relief through state remedies have been exhausted. 49 The
Fifth Circuit's position implicitly suggests that Texas procedure suf-
fers from exactly that deficiency admitted by the panel in Huffhines.
A firmer posture by the Court of Criminal Appeals, recognizing the
need to tailor appellate jurisdiction within the constitutional powers
accorded the court in the Texas Constitution, would have adequately
protected the rights of criminal defendants without necessitating fed-
eral court intervention in these matters.
Hufflhines hardly represents the most egregious action on the
part of the Court of Criminal Appeal in construing constitutional
provisions protecting criminal defendants. While Huffhines merely
reflects a failure to act, the Court has acted positively to emasculate
the Texas constitutional limitation on appeal by the state in criminal
matters.50 The state has traditionally been precluded from undertak-
ing an appeal from an adverse decision. In Texas v. White' for ex-
ample, a prosecutor successfully appealed an adverse ruling from the
Court of Criminal Appeals to the United States Supreme Court.
The federal constitution contains no express limitation on the gov-
ernment's right to appeal in criminal actions, and thus the Court was
not prohibited from hearing the case by the Texas provision. On
remand, however, the Court of Criminal Appeals chastised the pros-
ecutor for. taking an appeal in direct violation of the state
constitution.52
Subsequently the court split in holding that the state could seek
review in the United States Supreme Court when a decision adverse
to the state was rendered, basing its holding on its interpretation of a
48. Thus, the court could have taken a new position on the availability of habeas corpus
based on the newly announced constitutional requirements of Purcs and Green.
49. Thus, in Baker v. Metcalfe, 633 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1981), the court concluded that
federal habeas relief was proper for raising the issue of prior jeopardy in light of the lack of
availability of interlocutory of extraordinary relief in Texas procedure.
50. Tex. Coast., art. 5, § 26, provides: "The state shall have no right of appeal in criminal
cases."
51. 423 U.S. 67 (1975).
52. 543 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976)
"We reiterate that we do not challenge the Supreme Court's holding in Texas v.
White; rather, we accord it its full binding effect. However, we do hold as a matter of
Texas criminal procedure that the State is, in the future, precluded from appealing a
case-by certiorari or otherwise, from this court to the United States Supreme
Court." at 369.
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Appellate Decisionmaking
federal constitutional guarantee. 3 The court's opinion in Faulder,
however, intimates that no additional erosion of the constitutional
constraint would be permitted.
4
The court has once again departed from the clear wording of
the Texas Constitution in affording the state the right to discretion-
ary review in the Court of Criminal Appeals from an adverse deci-
sion rendered in the Court of Appeals. With the restructuring of
criminal appellate review in the state,56 the court has adopted an
approach in which only discretionary appellate review in the Court
of Criminal Appeals is available in most matters. 7 The state, by
virtue of rules issued by the court, is now accorded an opportunity to
seek review from any adverse decision suffered during the first round
of appellate review. 8
Thus, in the period since White59 the court has not only reversed
itself on the issue of review of its decisions in the Supreme Court, but
also on issues of exclusively state law arising in matters confined to
the jurisdiction of Texas courts as well. This departure from the un-
ambiguous language of the constitutional limitation might be argued
as justified on the theory that the state does not enjoy a "right to
appeal," but only the right to seek discretionary review. 60 The dis-
tinction might be analogized to the distinction between a right to
appeal in the federal system and the right to seek discretionary re-
view by petition for certiorari. The problem with this argument is
that it rests largely on distinctions which ignore the increasing per-
ception that appellate review in the courts of last resort is realisti-
cally a matter of discretion. Further, it ignores the fact that the
Court of Criminal Appeals has now achieved by rulemaking what
the people of Texas have resisted when they defeated a proposed
amendment to the Texas Constitution which would have accorded
the state a right to appeal. Both Huffhines and the evolution of the
state's right of appeal demonstrate the lack of commitment to the
constitution on the part of the court. In the first instance, the panel's
hesitance to recognize the legitimacy of the writ of habeas corpus as
53. Faulder v. State, 612 S.W.2d 513 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
54. Id.
55. Tex. Cr. App. R. 304(a), adopted 1981.
56. Tex. CONST. art. 5, §§ 4, 5, and 6, as amended November 4, 1980, effective September
1, 1981, by adoption of S/R No. 36, sec. 4, Acts 1979, 66th Legislature, p. 3224.
57. Tex. Cr. App. R. 304(a), adopted 1981.
58. Supra, n. 55.
59. White, 543 S.W.2d 366.
60. The court did not, however, distinguish between appeal and petition for writ of certio-
rari in "prohibiting" the State from seeking Supreme Court review in White, id.
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a means for reviewing double jeopardy claims suggest the court is
unwilling to take a position in defense of individual rights that might
be construed as violative of the legislature's position. In "inviting"
the legislature to update the procedure, albeit by implication only,
the court merely displays weakness in confronting a difficult issue.
Political expedience may not be the only reason for the court's shift-
ing position on the state's interest in appeal, but it is one factor that
explains why the court has abandoned its forceful, constitutional de-
fense in White.6"
Defense counsel are acutely sensitive to the interaction between
an appellate court and constitutional guarantees because the failure
of the court to enforce those guarantees renders their protections vir-
tually meaningless. The court cannot be expected to formulate law
on the basis of policy; such a position is inconsistent with recognized
notions of the limitations of judicial review. However, where the
court recognizes a problem of constitutional magnitude or ignores
the clear protection afforded the individual by a constitutional guar-
antee, the court fails to act soundly.
II.
Defense counsel frequently complain that appellate courts do
not apply principles of law logically or consistently. The complaint
is particularly appropriate when the decision and rationale suggest
that political considerations have influenced the court. This causes
counsel to lose confidence in the appellate court's willingness to cor-
rect errors made by trial judges, and defeats reliance on appellate
decisionmaking as an instrument of "corrective justice."
Collins v. State62 demonstrates the type of problem inherent in
faulty judicial reasoning which undermines the appellate court's
work and image. In Collins, a panel of the Court of Criminal Ap-
peals63 reversed the appellant's conviction on the ground that the
state had failed to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, an essential
element of the offense, "penetration of the female sex organ by the
male sex organ."'  The panel opinion was not published but instead,
61. White, 423 U.S. 67 and 543 S.W.2d 366.
62. Collins v. State, 602 S.W.2d 537 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), en banc.
63. The panel opinion issued in Collins v. State, was delivered in #58,247 (Tex. Crim.
App. 11/21/79), authored by Judge Tom Davis. Serving on the panel with Judge Davis were
Judges Odom and Clinton [hereinafter referred to as Collins panel].
64. The Appellant was charged with the offense of rape of a child, defined by Section
21.09(a) of the Texas Penal Code:
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was withdrawn after rehearing was granted by the entire court.6 5
On rehearing, the Court of Criminal Appeals sustained the
panel's reversal of the conviction, but altered significantly the relief
accorded the appellant. The panel concluded that since the state
failed to prove an essential element of the offense charged, the cause
should be reversed and judgment of acquittal entered. In its en bane
decision, however, the court ruled that the proper disposition of the
case was remand for new trial.66 Analysis of the en banc opinion
rationale points up several deficiencies in the court's reasoning.
The Collins reversal was predicated on the improper admission
of hearsay testimony concerning the issue of penetration of the vic-
tim during the assault.67 The trial court improperly permitted the
victim's grandmother and a detective to testify regarding statements
made by the victim concerning the assault. This testimony was criti-
cal because the complainant could not, herself, provide testimony at
trial regarding this element of the offense. According to the panel,68
the testimony of the grandmother and the detective constituted the
only "evidence" offered by the state at trial tending to prove that the
accused had penetrated the complainant. The panel concluded this
testimony was improperly admitted, a point conceded by the state in
moving for rehearing. The court, en bane, agreed that the trial judge
had committed reversible error in permitting the state to offer this
testimony.
The critical distinction between the relief afforded by the
panel-acquittal-and that authorized by the en bane reversal-re-
mand for new trial-is that the panel's disposition would have
barred retrial for the offense under the rule announced by the
Supreme Court in Burks v. United States69 and applied to the states
in Greene v. Massey.7° In Burks and Greene the Court held that a
conviction based upon insufficient evidence is constitutionally defec-
tive and requires reversal and entry of acquittal. However, the rule
A person commits an offense if he has sexual intercourse with a female not his wife
and she is younger than 17 years.
"Sexual intercourse" is defined in Section 21.01(3) ofthe Texas Penal Code as "... any pene-
tration of the female sex organ by the male sex organ."
65. Texas Rules of Post-Trial and Appellate Procedure in a Criminal Case 308(a),
adopted 1981.
66. 602 S.W.2d 539.
67. Id. at 538-539.
68. Collins panel, supra, note 63.
69. 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
70. 437 U.S. 19 (1978).
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is complicated by the circumstances of Greene,7 in which a reversal
by the Florida Supreme Court could not clearly be construed as
based on the grounds of insufficiency of evidence. In reaching the
rule applying the Double Jeopardy Clause to state convictions based
on insufficient evidence, the Court noted that a reversal based on
trial error would not necessarily result in entry of judgment of ac-
quittal barring further prosecution.72 The Florida reversal in Greene
had been based, in part, on a special concurrence by some members
of that court indicating trial error as the basis for their decision,
rather than insufficiency of evidence.
Thus, the Greene court opened the door for appellate determi-
nation of the cause of reversal as a critical factor in assessing
whether the Double Jeopardy Clause bars retrial. The Court of
Criminal Appeals had adopted the Burks rule in decisions antedat-
ing Collins, applying it both on direct appeal73 and in attacks on
convictions by post-conviction writs of habeas corpus. 74 The Collins
court, however, chose to characterize its basis for reversal as trial
error in the admission of the hearsay, following the suggestion of
Greene.75 Thus, since the court rejected the panel's conclusion 76 that
insufficiency provided the basis for reversal, the judges were not re-
quired to order entry of acquittal barring any further prosecution of
the appellant.77
Moreover, the Collins court refused to examine the record to
determine whether the propery admitted evidence would have been
sufficient to support the conviction. 78  Instead, Judge Clinton con-
71. LId
72. The panel opinion relied on both Burks and Greene, notes 8 and 9, as authority for its
conclusion that re-trial would not be proper in Collins, panel, supra at 64.
73. Walden v. State, 579 S.W.2d 499 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), holding retrial barred where
first conviction resulted from insufficient evidence.
74. Ex parte Duran, 581 S.W.2d 683 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), reversal for trial error does
not preclude a second trial.
75. 437 U.S. 19.
76. Thus, the panel concluded, with respect to the essential element of the offense,
penetration:
The testimony of the prosecutrix that appellant "put something between her legs"
does not prove penetration nor does this testimony, coupled with the other probative
testimony suffice to disprove every outstanding reasonable hypothesis except that of
the guilt of the accused. We find the evidence insufficient to support the conviction.
Collins panel, at 3. The panel applied the Texas construction of the State's burden of proof in
a circumstantial evidence case, that the evidence disprove every reasonable hypothesis § except
that of the guilt of the accused. Cf. Draper v. State, 513 S.W.2d 563, 565 (Tex. Crim. App,
1974).
77. 602 S.W.2d 539.
78. Id
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cluded that trial error constituted grounds for reversal and that no
consideration of the evidence within the context of the "harmless er-
ror rule" could lead to a conclusion other than reversal.79 Yet, he
declined to lead the majority into an examination of the sufficiency
of the properly admitted evidence:
Having found error and made the determination that it is
reversible, we should simply reverse the judgment of con-
viction and remand for a new trial if the State be so ad-
vised, without undertaking to examine appellant's
contention that the evidence is insufficient to convict.
What evidence? That error-tainted evidence which the jury
heard and obviously considered or that which remains after
the contamination is metaphysically eliminated? The for-
mer manifestly will not do and the latter becomes an exer-
cise in the abstract- forming conclusions for ourselves" is
the way the court put it more than 120years ago in Draper v.
State. . . . (emphasis added).8"
Thus, Judge Clinton expresses the court's reluctance to supplant the
thinking of the jury with that of the appellate judges,8' characteriz-
ing the process as an "exercise in the abstract."8" Although he refers
to the century-old rule of Draper8 3 in support of his argument, his
point hardly rings true in light of the court's willingness to supplant
its judgment for that of the jury when ruling that improperly admit-
ted evidence will not require reversal in some cases because the error
is "harmless," 84 the principle he refers to in refusing to deem the
error in Collins "harmless.
85
Further, Judge Clinton's perception that the "jury heard and
obviously considered" 86 the hearsay, suggests that he cannot fully
divorce himself from invading the mind of the jury in assessing the
probable basis for the verdict.
In Collins the appellant requested the court to review the evi-
dence properly admitted at trial to determine whether the state of-
79. Judge Clinton observed, "Indeed, implicitly in its motion for rehearing the State ac-
cepts that conclusion [that Hearsay had been admitted improperly] in each instance. Clearly
the hearsay is damaging and the two errors in admitting it are reversible." 602 S.W.2d at 538.
80. Id. at 539.
81. "The verdict, then, is the product of reversible trial error, and in earlier times an
appellate court would not examine the record to see whether enough competent evidence re-
mained to sustain the verdict." Id.
82. Id.
83. Draper v. State, 22 Tex. 400 (1858).
84. Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18 (1967); Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250
(1969); Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972).
85. See supra note 79.
86. 602 S.W.2d at 539.
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fered sufficient competent evidence to sustain a conviction. The en
banc opinion attempts to explain that a court cannot properly try a
case omitting improperly admitted evidence, to make a proper deter-
mination." Yet, when the court holds that improperly admitted evi-
dence did not prejudice the rights of an accused,88 and does not
require reversal, it essentially performs the same type of mental-not
metaphysical8g-function. Similarly, the appellate court makes the
same type of determination when it reviews sufficiency of accomplice
testimony to determine whether the testimony is adequately corrobo-
rated to insure accuracy necessary for conviction.90 The court's
opinions readily admit that it must engage in a weighing of the rela-
tive merits of testimony and sources of testimony in guaging suffi-
ciency when accomplice testimony is essential for conviction.
Apparently, the court is simply unwilling to engage in the same
process when the result could render a decision favorable to an ac-
cused and barring retrial. While the court will engage in speculating
that improperly admitted evidence did not unduly influence a jury to
convict, the court is not willing to afford the same benefit of specula-
tion to the accused.
Judge Roberts, joined by Judges Phillips and Dally, concurred
with Judge Clinton in the result reached in Collins.91 He argued that
the accused simply did not phrase his point of error properly.92 The
point, according to the concurring judges, should have focused on
the entire body of evidence presented, rather than asking the court to
consider only properly admitted evidence:
If Collins had claimed that all the evidence-including
the hearsay which was improperly admitted-was insuffi-
cient, we would have considered the claim even though we
had found reversible trial error.93
This position suggests that improperly admitted evidence could have
formed an adequate basis for conviction. The problem with this is
that it leads to the conclusion that hearsay, as the court characterizes
the improperly admitted testimony in Collins, can be considered evi-
87. Id
88. "Harmless error rule," see supra cases cited note 84.
89. Collins note 80 and accompanying text.
90. Myers v. State, #61,499 (Tex. Crim. App. Jan. 27, 1982), construing statutory require-
ment of Art. 38.14, Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.
91. 602 S.W.2d at 539-540, opinion of Roberts, J., concurring.
92. Id, at 540.
93. Id
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dence.94 This conflicts with prior decisions in which the court has
ruled that hearsay is incompetent and has no probative value.95
Some evidentiary irregularities leading to reversal could, of course,
be corrected on retrial, such as the case where the state fails to lay a
proper predicate for testimony which would otherwise be properly
admitted.96 In that type of case, reversal based on trial error should
not result in a bar to further prosecution. However, the statements
admitted in Collins were so clearly improper that the court indicated
no hesitance in reversing97 and even led the state to confess error in
its application for rehearing.98 The court offers no explanation of
how the state could properly qualify the statements on retrial under
any exception to the hearsay rule. Thus, there is no basis for arguing
that the error could be cured by proper action in the trial court
which would permit the state to establish the essential element of the
offense of rape by relying on the testimony of the grandmother and
the detective.
Judge Clinton misses the point when he suggests that the appel-
lant's request would require the court to improperly evaluate the de-
liberative process of the jury. Instead, appellant merely asked the
court to search the record for competent evidence supporting an es-
sential element of the offense charged. In absence of competent evi-
dence supporting the element of penetration, the evidence would
have been in any case insufficient to support conviction.99 This de-
termination is far easier than the one required by the "harmless er-
94. In the panel opinion, Judge Davis had rejected, totally, the argument that the hearsay
could suggest conviction:
Even if the testimony of the two witnesses had been admitted without objection
we could not give any probative value to same in determining the sufficiency of the
evidence.
95. Bonds v. State, 573 S.W.2d 528 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
96. For example, evidence may be admitted under statute, such as the records act, Article
3737e, Texas Revised Civil Statutes, without compliance with the statutory requisites. Com-
pliance with the statute affords the party offering the evidence an exception to the hearsay rule.
Hence, evidence improperly admitted due to technical failure to comply with the statutory
requirement might be properly admitted by showing the proper predicate for admission upon
retrial. Cf. Gassett v. State, 532 S.W.2d 328 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976).
97. 602 S.W.2d at 538. See also Oldham v. State, 322 S.W.2d 616 (Tex. Crim. App. 1959).
98. Id
99. The Court applied the same principle in rejecting review of sufficiency claims once it
has determined that evidence was improperly admitted at trial. Clark v. State, #62,969 (Tex.
Crim. App. Sept. 23, 1981). However, where error requiring reversal does not reflect improp-
erly admitted evidence, the Court will review insufficiency of evidence grounds of error.
Swabado v. State, 597 S.W.2d 361 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980); Hooker v. State, #59279 (Tex.
Crim. App. Sept. 23, 1981).
AM. J. CRIM. LAW
ror" principle which necessarily requires the court to speculate on
thp use made of evidence by the jury.
A second problem demonstrated by the court's disposition in
Collins is the failure of the court to adequately explain the basis for
its decision. Judge Clinton writes that the judgment of acquittal
would result in an unsatisfactory result for the appellant:
We torture the rights of the appellant as well, for he is
entitled to have his fate decided by a jury upon competent
evidence under proper instructions from the trial court.0 0
As a general principle, Judge Clinton's point is valid. To suggest
however, that the appellant would prefer retrial'before another jury
based on "competent evidence" and 'proper instructions," rather
than the acquittal ordered by the panel, is fanciful at best. The rea-
soning completely ignores the risk of conviction which appellant
would face, coupled with the pressures of a second trial noted by the
Supreme Court in Abney v. United States.' Judge Clinton's per-
sonal speculation of how the appellant would view the acquittal de-
nied by the court on rehearing is apparently the basis of this
statement. It is possible, of course, that an accused might prefer re-
trial under some remote circumstance, but a system of criminal law
which places the burden of proof on the state 0 2 and affords the ac-
cused an absolute right not to testify,10 3 presupposes virtually the op-
posite-that an accused would not welcome trial if acquittal on the
record were the alternative. Had appellant Collins truly sought the
fair trial suggested by Judge Clinton instead of the panel's order of
acquittal, he could conceivably have moved for rehearing himself.
The court fails to mention any demand of this by the appellant.
Conversely, the court strains to suggest that entry of acquittal
would be unfair to the state because the prosecution may have
elected to rely on the inadmissible hearsay, rather than competent
evidence, in proving its case:
In pursuing such a fanciful endeavor (reviewing only
the admissible evidence to determine sufficiency) we do an
injustice to the State, for necessarily it must be assumed
what could well be absolutely contrary to the case: that the
prosecuting attorney mustered, assembled and laid before
the jury all evidence known and available to him. ...
For this Court to award appellant the acquittal he
100. 602 S.W.2d at 539.
101. 431 U.S. 651 (1977).
102. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 2.01 (Vernon 1974).
103. U.S. CONST. amend. V; Tex CONsT. art. I, § 10.
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desires on "insufficient" evidence without assurance that
the State has exhausted its resources-and this record
surely does not provide it-thwarts the quite valid public
concern that the guilty be punished."°
Based on this reasoning the Double Jeopardy Clause would never
bar reprosecution unless the record affirmatively demonstrated that
the state utilized all available witnesses and evidence in the initial
prosecution. This interpretation wholly fails to satisfy the protection
against continuing prosecution inherent in both the Fifth Amend-
ment and the double jeopardy guarantee of the Texas
Constitution. 105
Judge Clinton's approach demonstrates a preference for convic-
tion at the expense of fair trial. It compromises the right of an ac-
cused to be free from multiple jeopardy in order to afford the state
additional opportunities to get its case right. In the concurring opin-
ion, however, Judge Roberts recognized that the majority opinion
went too far in suggesting that the state should be afforded unlimited
opportunities to try the accused. He observed:
The general principle mandated by our double jeop-
ardy provisions is that the State acts at its peril if it fails to
put on sufficient proof. We should not be understood to
say that the State can unjustifiably rely on improper proof
while holding back its available proper proof for the retrial
which will follow reversal. 106
Interestingly, Judge Roberts is able to conclude that the State should
be able to retry appellant Collins since it relied on the ruling of the
trial court that the hearsay could be offered before the jury. Of
course, this distinction is artificial since all error is the result of the
action of the trial judge and not the attorney for the State. This be-
ing the case, one can conceive of few instances in which the state
could not rely on Judge Roberts' "catch 22" in arguing for retrial on
104. 602 S.W.2d at 539.
105. U.S. CONST. amend V; Tex CONST. art. I, § 14.
106. 602 S.W.2d 540. Consider also Hudson v. Louisiana, 445 U.S. 960 (1981). InHudson,
the Supreme Court rejects the proposition put forward by Judge Clinton in Collins. Hudson
was tried for the offense of murder and convicted by a Louisiana jury. He was granted a new
trial, on motion, by the trial judge who stated in the record that the evidence was wholly
lacking to establish Hudson's guilt of the offense. The State's application for certiorari to the
Louisiana Supreme Court was denied, but the State commenced a new prosecution against the
accused. During the second trial, the State offered the testimony of an eyewitness to the crime
who had not testified in the first trial. The conviction obtained after the second trial was
affirmed, 361 So. 2d 858 (La. 1978) and habeas relief also denied, 373 So. 2d 1294 (La. 1979).
On writ of certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed, holding that the second trial was barred by
the grant of new trial for insufficient evidence, and that the State was precluded from trying
the accused a second time even with the additional probative testimony.
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the theory that it was the trial judge who allowed the state to offer
inadmissible testimony. This formulation ignores the professional
duty of the prosecutor to know the rules of evidence and exercise
proper discretion in offering evidence at trial.'0 7 In Collins the ap-
pellate court found no question that the hearsay had been errone-
ously admitted and even the state conceded the error in making its
application for rehearing.
The court's action in Collins, moreover, is not likely to be criti-
cized on appeal to federal courts. In Tapp v. Lucas I" the Fifth Cir-
cuit held that it would be bound by the characterization of a state
appellate court in ruling the basis for reversal is "trial error."'
' 0 9
Thus, an appellant deprived of an acquittal by mischaracterization
will not likely be afforded relief by taking his case to a higher court.
Collins is the type of frustrating opinion which illustrates the
work of a court not impartial in its review of convictions obtained in
lower courts. The decision reflects a concern on the part of the court
for conviction of the expense of protecting constitutionally guaran-
teed promises of liberty. This type of decision might be expected to
avoid unpopularity with an electorate concerned with effective pros-
ecution of criminals. Additionally, it suggests that the court with-
holds from criminal defendants the benefits of intellectual processes
routinely used by the court to support affirmances. In fact, the real-
ity of Collins is that the court faced the alternative of acquitting a
child rapist or remanding the case. The probable consequence of
remand would be a plea bargain, especially in light of the earlier
conviction and reversal. Rather than make a difficult choice, it
searched and found a theory for returning the decision to the trial
court.
III.
The stance taken by a legal system toward expostfacto applica-
tion of law"t0 reveals the quality of justice it provides. Article 1,
107. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 201 (Vernon 1965).
108. 658 F.2d 383 (5th Cir. 1981).
109. Tapp v. State, 373 So. 2d 1029, 1031 (Miss. 1979).
110. The principle nullapoena sine lege is one generally respected by civilized nations.
The reason the retrospective criminal statute is so universally condemned does not
arise merely from the fact that in criminal litigation the stakes are high. It arises
also-and chiefly-because of all branches of law, the criminal law is most obviously
and directly concerned with shaping and controlling human conduct. It is the retro-
active criminal statute that calls most directly to mind the brutal absurdity of com-
manding a man today to do something yesterday.
FULLER, THE MORALITY OF LAW (1964).
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section 16 of the Texas Constitution, provides:
No bill of attainder, ex post facto law, retroactive law, or
any law impairing the obligation of contracts, shall be
made. " '
This provision echoes the prohibition against retroactive legislation
incorporated in the United States Constitution."'
How a court deals with the issue of retroactivity indicates the
extent to which the appellate courts seek to promote fairness in ad-
ministering the criminal law. The simplest example of the interplay
between fairness and retroactivity is the concept of notice: retroac-
tive legislation imposes criminal penalties for conduct the individual
did not know was criminal."t 3 Generally, an individual is entitled to
the benefits afforded by changes in the law, but is not to be penalized
retroactively by changing doctrine or legislation.' '
4
A "hard case" is presented by the decision in Johnson v.
State," 1 5 a prosecution for theft," ' 6 in which the defendant's convic-
tion resulted in an enhanced punishment of life imprisonment." 7
The unpublished opinion of the court provides little insight into the
problem discussed here. Johnson was tried and convicted on the
testimony of a security guard serving as the complaining witness in
the case. After conviction, but before his appellate briefs had been
filed with the trial court, the Court of Criminal Appeals issued rever-
sals of conviction in McGee v. State" 8 and Commons v. State,"9 the
latter an en bane opinion. In these decisions the court ruled that
testimony of a security guard would not be sufficient to establish that
the accused had taken property "without the effective consent of the
owner'20 since the guard lacked the necessary ownership interest in
the property.
11. Tex CONST. art. 1, § 16.
112. "No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed." U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 9.
113. Fuller, supra note 1.
114. In order to be characterized as retroactive or ex post facto, the law must be "more
onerous than the prior law." Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 294 (1977).
115. Johrison v. State, 606 S.W.2d 894 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980). References to Appellant's
argument on appeal are based upon interviews with Appellant's attorney on appeal, J. Blake
Withrow, Esq., of Dallas, Texas.
116. TEx PENAL CODE ANN. § 31.03 (Vernon 1965).
117. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1965). This provision has been upheld
by the Supreme Court in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. 263 (1980).
118. McGee v. State, 572 S.W.2d 723 (Fex. Crim. App. 1978).
119. Commons v. State, 575 S.W.2d 518 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
120. York v. State, 566 S.W.2d 936, 939 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
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Applying the court's reasoning in McGee,12' Johnson's attorney
on appeal attacked the sufficiency of the evidence at trial to establish
the ownership element of the offense. His motion for expedited ap-
peal based upon the McGee holding was granted. 22 However, the
court did not expedite the matter, and Johnson remained undecided
a year later when the court overturned McGee in Compton v.
State, 23 an en bane decision in which the court reversed its stance
on the security guard issue. Based on Compton, the court affirmed
Johnson's conviction and life sentence, 24 holding that the security
guard's testimony was sufficient to demonstrate that Johnson had
taken property "without the effective consent of the owner."
The court's changing position on the use of security guard testi-
mony to prove ownership presents little substantive problem. It
seems logical that a corporate owner can not lawfully delegate suffi-
cient possessory interest in merchandise or property so as to enable a
security guard to hold a greater interest in the property than the ac-
cused, 25 although Judge Clinton provides a stinging argument
against this position in his dissent.1 26  The problem is the court's
disposition of cases on appeal at the time a new ruling is issued, re-
versing a previous statement of law. In Johnson, the court's backlog
and delay, causing cases not to be decided for 24-30 months,
27
worked to deprive the appellant of a favorable statement of law ap-
plicable at the time he filed his appellate brief. Counsel for the ap-
pellant, recognizing that the McGee holding should have permitted
the court to dispose of the case expeditiously, sought relief that
would have afforded appellant a favorable judgment based upon the
McGee reasoning.
28
121. Johnson's theft offense was alleged to have been committed in 1977, which antedated
the decision in McGee.
122. Commons had affirmed McGee, by en banc opinion, in the interim.
123. Compton v. State, 607 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
124. The affirmance came on October 22, 1980, two weeks after the Court's reversal of
McGee in Compton.
125. Judge Clinton, dissenting in Johnson, found the substantive shift in the law to be of
considerable consequence, however. He argued that the shift toward liberalizing proof of
ownership effectively diluted the requirement that the State demonstrate lack of consent of the
owner to the asportation. For Judge Clinton the ultimate consequence of the Court's retreat
on the issue would be to permit persons who could never give consent in the context of owner-
ship, a dockworker, eg, to testify that they had not consented to the taking of the accused.
126. Compton, supra note 14.
127. Based on estimates given the author by Court of Criminal Appeals staff in 1981.
128. Whether proof of ownership offered through a security guard constitutes a legal fail-
ure of proof, such that the reversal should also entitle a litigant to entry ofjudgment of acquit-
tal, is not clear. The Supreme Court's decisions in Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978)
and Greene v. Massey, 437 U.S. 19 (1978) would seem to suggest that acquittal is proper
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The difficulty posed by the Johnson affimance is not that the
appellant suffered a serious injustice because he was convicted on
the testimony of a security guard. Instead, the problem is the failure
of an appellate court to accommodate both the interests of justice
and the reality of its own docket. The error in Johnson went not to
trial error conceivably waived by appellant's failure to make objec-
tion at trial; 29 this has long been an accepted, if unsatisfactory, the-
ory for explaining why some litigants will ultimately be deprived of
the benefits of changing law. Rather, the error involved the suffi-
ciency of the evidence to support the conviction, a constitutional
matter that cannot be waived except by plea of guilty. If the defend-
ant pleads guilty, he has supplied the proof that might have been
missing from the state's case. Thus, when the court issued McGee
and Commons, it held that a conviction could not rest on security
guard testimony alone as to matters of ownership. These holdings
announced a rule for validity of the conviction, not for admission of
evidence or exclusion130 or any other matter relating to the conduct
of trial.
When the court changed its position appellate counsel properly
presented the argument that Johnson's conviction must fail because
it rested on inadequate evidence. Had the court decided the case in
timely fashion, Johnson would have been freed from his life sen-
tence. '3  Instead, the court waited until two weeks after its reversal
of McGee and Commons to affirm Johnson. 32 The timing suggests
that, despite the motion to expedite and the clear authority of McGee
remedy. Ownership is a matter of legal proof and thus, the State, failing to make a legally-
required showing of proof, might be barred from retrial. However, there is some thought that
such a failure would not be fatal to the State's option to re-try, mostly as suggested in the
distinction between insufficiency and absence of legally-required evidence, or evidence which
would keep the case from the jury.
129. Sufficiency of evidence is waived only by entry of a plea of guilty. Otherwise, it is
subject to litigation even by collateral attack. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
130. Consider the court's refusal to apply Mincey v. Arizona, 437 U.S. 385 (1978) to Ap-
pellant's complaint of an illegal search in Swink v. State, 617 S.W.2d 203 (Tex. Crim. App.
1981). The search occurred after the date of the search in Mincey, but prior to the date of the
Supreme Court's decision. In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 (1965), Justice Clark, author
of the Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) opinion, considered the retroactive application of the
principle of exclusion to state convictions which had become final prior to the issuance of
Mapp. Speaking for the majority, he concluded that those state court defendants whose con-
victions had become final prior to M'app could not enjoy its benefits. However, as Justice
Clark noted, Mapp "has also been applied to cases still pending on direct review at the time it
was rendered."
131. Assuming the reversal was based on insufficient evidence; see supra note 128.
132. Compton was decided on October 8, 1980. The Court affirmed Johnson on October
22, 1980.
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and Commons, the court simply held the case until the law was
changed.
Johnson presents a difficult problem of appellate justice because
the accused was deprived of a favorable change in the law due to the
failure of the appellate court to hear his case in timely fashion. For a
brief period of time, between McGee and Compton, an accused liti-
gating a security guard issue in a Texas trial court would have
benefitted from the court's construction in McGee. However, an ac-
cused making his claim on appeal during the same period of time
could have been deprived of the court's favorable interpretation by
its inability or unwillingness to hear his case before the law was
changed.
The Johnson case does not present the traditional ex post facto
law issue since the law was essentially identical at the time of his
trial and on the date of the appellate court's decision. However, in
terms of the constitutional application of due process standards in
the evaluation of sufficiency of evidence contentions, it is arguable
that the court's disposition of his claim reached the same result that
is traditionally associated with expostfacto application of law. The
case points to the injustice that may result from delay in the judicial
process. In Johnson, delay worked to deprive the appellant of proper
application of changing law.
IV.
Defense counsel are often confronted by the ambiguities pro-
duced when an appellate court refuses to take a stand on a particular
issue. When the court bases its rulings on alternative grounds, at-
tornies are forced to guess what the court will do when it ultimately
decides a point. This problem occurs either when the court fails to
interpret a statute or fails to give constitutional or statutory language
effect based on its plain meaning.
The treatment given searches for blood is an example of the
Court of Criminal Appeals' failure to take a stand. 133 Searches and
seizures of blood, particularly under warrant, have presented no con-
stitutional problem for the United States Supreme Court. In
133. Fearance v. State, 620 S.W.2d 577, (rex. Crim. App. 1980), cerl. denied, 102 Sup. Ct.
400 (1981). In Fearance, the accused was convicted of capital murder and sentenced to death.
The evidence included testimony from an expert witness that the blood of the accused and of
the deceased were both present on clothing owned by the accused. His blood had been taken,
for purposes of testing by the expert, pursuant to a warrant authorizing the seizure. The case
was reversed and remanded on other grounds and the issue of legality of the search was not
ruled upon by the Court.
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Schmerber v. California,'34 the Court held that the Fifth Amend-
ment135 protection against self-incrimination was not violated by the
introduction of evidence related to the blood of the accused. Thus,
seizure of blood is measured solely by Fourth Amendment' 36 stan-
dards governing search and seizure.
Under Texas law, the Court of Criminal Appeals has held that
blood may be seized only if the appropriate constitutional and statu-
tory requirements are met.' 37 Thus, Article 1, Section 9138 was ini-
tially construed as prohibiting seizures of blood, even under warrant,
because the statutory provision governing issuance of warrants did
not authorize seizure of this type of material.' 39 The court's ap-
proach demonstrates a situation in which the state constitutional or
statutory provision may restrict police activity to a greater extent
than the federal constitution.
40
Article 18.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure governs
issuances of search warrants. 14 1 The Court of Criminal Appeals
held, prior to the amendment of this section, that the provision did
not authorize issuance of a warrant for seizure of blood. A defend-
ant who was subjected to seizure of blood, even under warrant, had a
valid objection to introduction of evidence resulting from such a
seizure since no warrant for blood could constitutionally issue. In
Escamilla v. State, 42 the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed, based
134. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
135. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
136. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
137. Escamilla v. State, 556 S.W.2d 796 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
138. The people shall be secure in their persons, houses, papers and possessions, from
all unreasonable seizures or searches, and no warrant to search any place, or to seize
any person or thing, shall issue without describing them as near as may be, nor with-
out probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation.
TEx. CONsT. art. I, § 9.
139. Article 18.02 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure specifically lists those things
which may be subjected to search under warrant.
140. There are areas of substantive and procedural rights in which state law may afford an
accused greater protection, based upon state constitutional or statutory construction, than that
required by the United States Constitution. Thus, an accused in Texas will enjoy protection of
a higher burden of proof upon the State when it relies on circumstantial evidence than would
be afforded by federal principles. Griffin v. State, #62, 792 (rex. Crim. App. April 15, 1981); a
more liberal rule of standing to challenge searches and seizures serves Texas defendants than
that announced in Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978)--consider Johnson v. State, 583
S.W.2d 399 (rex. Crim. App. 1979); Kleasen v. State, 560 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977)
(an accused may demonstrate standing by showing that possession of the object seized is itself
an essential element of the offense with which he is charged.)
141. Supra, note 139.
142. 556 S.W.2d 796.
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upon the express limitation on warrants created by Articles 18.01143
and 18.02.
Despite the rationale advanced in Escamilla, the court has held
in other cases that the accused could waive his right not to have
blood seized and the resulting evidence could be introduced against
him at trial. In Ferguson v. State,' 44 the court suggested that an ac-
cused could waive his rights under Article 1, Section 9, just as he
could waive rights under the Fourth Amendment by failing to make
a timely objection to introduction of the blood-related evidence.
The Ferguson court did not address the issue of whether Article
18.02, as amended, authorized seizures of blood. 45  The amended
language provides that a warrant may issue for:
(10) property or items, except the personal writings of
the accused, constituting evidence of an offense or consti-
tuting evidence tending to show that a particular person
committed an offense.1
4 6
Clearly, blood might satisfy the latter definition of evidence subject
to seizure. It could be defined as "property or items," but that use of
the statutory language is likely to generate some argument.4 7 In Fer-
guson, the court did not rule on whether the amended language in-
cluded seizures of blood under warrant. 148  Instead, the court
focused on the dual issues of waiver 149 and harmless error,S ° and
143. "(a) A 'search warrant' is a written order, issued by a magistrate and directed to a
peace officer, commanding him to search for any property or thing and to seize the same and
bring it before such magistrate." TEx. CODE OF CEUM. PRO ANN. art. 18.01(a) (Vernon 1965).
144. Ferguson v. State, 573 S.W.2d 516 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
145. Id
146. The amended provisions of Article 18.02 include a general provision relating to
seizure of property or items which are either evidence of an offense, or that tend to show that a
particular individual committed an offense.
147. Whether "blood" could be appropriately characterized as either "property" or
"items" is an issue open to debate. Section 31.01(6) defines "property" as: "(A) real property;
(B) tangible or intangible personal property including anything severed from land; (C) a docu-
ment, including money, that represents or embodies anything of value."
In Article 3.01, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, the Legislature has mandated that
"words, phrases and terms used in this Code are to be taken and understood in their usual
acceptation in common language, except where specifically defined." Absent such definition
which would include "blood," a substance, in the commonly used concept of "item," it would
seem that it is neither "property or items" for purposes of the Code.
148. Yet, the Court suggests in Ferguson, supra note 144, that "blood" will ultimately be
held to be included in the meaning of Subsection (10) as either property or items subject to
seizure. The Court observes that blood can only be obtained as a result of lawful search under
warrant, or upon consent of the accused.
149. That an accused may waive any right secured to him by law, except the right to trial
by jury in a capital case, is established by Article 1.14, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. In
Jurek v. Estelle, 593 F.2d 672 (5th Cir. 1979), the Court suggested that constitutional error
relating to improper exclusion of capital veniremen based on violations of Witherspoon v.
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concluded that the conviction did not merit reversal, even though it
rested in part on the evidence resulting from the blood seizure.
Ferguson followed Smith v. State, 5I a decision predating the
amendment to Article 18.02. There, the court expressly held that the
pre-amendment language of the statute could not be construed to
authorize seizures under warrant for blood. Yet, the court had
noted, a free and voluntary consent to the seizure could excuse the
absence of a legally-sufficient warrant. The Smith court based its
affirmance on the "harmless error" doctrine, applied in spite of the
constitutional error.
The sequence of cases suggests the curious situation in which
otherwise illegal activity by the state-such as a search conducted
under an invalid warrant-might prove "legal" based upon the con-
sent of the accused. Although consent is a recognized basis for
waiver of constitutional rights, 5 1 it necessarily opens the door to co-
ercion and unsatisfactory after the fact determinations of whether
the accused actually gave his consent freely and voluntarily.
More importantly, the blood search cases pose a dilemma when
the issue of waiver does not rest on consent. In Bell v. State,153 the
court affirmed the conviction despite counsel's objection to introduc-
tion of evidence based on the seizure of appellant's blood under a
search warrant. The objection was couched in terms of the accused's
rights arising under the Fifth Amendment, an issue disposed of ad-
versely in Schmerber.54 Counsel did not phrase his objection in
terms of rights protected under Article 1, Section 9 of the Texas Con-
stitution and the court held that there was a waiver of any claim
under that provision because he based the objection improperly.
155
The problem with the court's disposition of the blood search
issue in Bell is that, while "consent" may waive a constitutional
right, in Bell it is not consent that is held to have caused a waiver,
but error by the accused's counsel. The accused did not in any sense
Illinois, 391 U.S. 510 (1968), would not be waived by a failure to make a timely, accurate
projection. See also, Darland v. State, 582 S.W.2d 452 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
150. The "harmless error" rule was approved in Chapman v. California, 386 U.S. 18
(1967).
151. Smith v. State, 557 S.W.2d 299 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
152. The concept of consent, which carries with it the implied waiver of a protection, has
been discussed and applied with respect to Fourth Amendment protections in Schneckloth v.
Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218 (1973) and Bumper v. North Carolina, 391 U.S. 543 (1968).
153. Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800 (rex. Crim. App. 1979). Bell is an appeal from a convic-
tion for capital murder.
154. Supra, note 134.
155. 582 S.W.2d 800.
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consent to the introduction of the evidence since an objection was, in
fact, lodged at the time of trial. The effect of the court's holding in
Bell is that the state can produce evidence of trial which it gained
illegally. This posture violates Article 38.23 of the Code of Criminal
Procedure' 56 which states that evidence seized in violation of either
the federal or Texas constitutions is not to be used in any criminal
proceeding. This statutory language is designed to prevent unlawful
police activity and to protect individual criminal defendants from
conviction based upon use of illegally secured evidence.
Assuming that the intent of Article 38.23 is best served by exclu-
sion of unlawfully seized evidence, the consent to illegal activity sug-
gested by the court as an acceptable basis for admission of evidence
in Smith and Ferguson raises an interesting issue. How far may
"consent" be applied to excuse illegal activity? For example, one
might question whether a confession, obtained as a result of physical
brutality should ever be admitted into evidence. Even if the accused
fails to object at trial, introduction of such a confession could hardly
be reconciled with the legislative intent of Article 38.23 since assault
committed by law enforcement officials constitutes a violation of
law. Once the accused offers any objection to the introduction of the
evidence, whether properly phrased or not, the court should have
some duty to weigh whether the evidence was obtained in violation
of law.
In the case of search warrants issued for seizure of blood, there
is no question that after Smith the court held warrants of this type
constitutionally invalid. That being the case, the Bell rationale
warps the protection ostensibly guaranteed by Article 38.23 since its
prohibition will be applicable only to illegal police activity correctly
objected to by the accused at trial.
In the blood search cases the court has made two essential mis-
156. Consider the Legislature's implicit intent in enacting Article 38.23, Texas Code of
Criminal Procedure. That article states:
No evidence obtained by an officer or other person in violation of any provisions
of the Constitution or laws of the State of Texas, or of the Constitution or laws of the
United States of America, shall be admitted in evidence against the accused on the
trial of any criminal case.
In any case where the legal evidence raises an issue hereunder, the jury shall be
instructed that if it believes, or has a reasonable doubt, that the evidence was taken in
violation of the provisions of this Article, then and in such event, the jury shall disre-
gard any such evidence so obtained.
If the language of the foregoing article is construed according to its plain meaning, then the
Court's accommodation of the blood seizure issue by resorting to concepts of waiver or con-
sent, appears quite improper. To rule that the illegal act-seizure of blood without author-
ity-can be justified because of the failure of the accused to raise the issue of implicit illegality,
simply defies the clear intent of the language of Article 38.23.
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takes. First, it failed to address the critical issue posed by the
amendment of Article 18.02 at the earliest opportunity: whether the
amended language would authorize a seizure of blood under war-
rant. 157 It chose instead to sidestep the central issue while discussing
the doctrines of consent and waiver. Thus, cases arising after the
effective date of the amendment were not clearly resolved by simple
decision on whether the amended language could accommodate
warrants for blood.
Second, the reliance on consent and waiver as bases for admissi-
bility and appellate approval of blood-seizure related evidence in
difficult cases deprives Article 38.23 of its clear legislative intent.
These cases do not present the issue of police activity in a judicial
vacuum in which officers are required to make decisions without ad-
vice regarding search and seizure. Instead, the court has held that
the issuance of a search warrant for seizure of blood, at least prior to
the amendment of Article 18.02, was improper under the Texas con-
stitution. However, when confronted with judicial acts apparently
undertaken in violation of Article 1, Section 9, the court has chosen
to hold that those acts can be ratified either by consent of the accused
or by failure to make a proper objection at trial. The very fact that a
warrant was used to obtain the sentence argues against the idea of
consent. The court fails to adequately delineate how far the state
may go in attempting to gain consent.
Only by ignoring the language of Article 38.23 can the court's
failure to enforce Escamilla through subsequent decision be ex-
plained. Otherwise, the sanction of that provision rests solely on the
knowledge and ability of the accused to properly exercise his consti-
tutional rights. 5  As Bell demonstrates, 59 this is often a difficult
157. The Court of Criminal Appeals has held that section 18.02 as amended will authorize
a warrant for blood in Gentry v. State, 640 S.W. 2d 899 (rex. Crim. App. 1982).
158. By analogy, the Court places an almost impossible burden on an accused who asserts
error in prosecutorial argument. The objection must be correctly phrased, Plunkett v. State,
580 S.W.2d 815 (rex. Crim. App. 1978), and timely made, Stone v. State, 583 S.W.2d 410 (rex.
Crim. App. 1979). Further, the accused must press his objection until he secures an unfavora-
ble ruling from the trial court, DeRusse v. State, 579 S.W.2d 224 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
Even when the ruling is obtained on the objection, motion to instruct the jury to disregard, or
mistrial-in that order, properly-the Court will often conclude that the instruction to the jury
by the trial court was sufficient to cure the alleged error and, thus, the motion for mistrial was
properly overruled. Johnson v. State, 583 S.W.2d 399 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
The burden placed on the defendant to continually object to improper argument by the
prosecutor, where the error was virtually continuous and prejudicial, so prejudiced the right of
the accused to a fair trial that the District Court granted habeas relief in Brown v. Estelle, 468
F. Supp. 42 (E.D. Tex. 1978), even though the defendant failed to object to each instance of
impropriety. The grant of relief was affirmed, 591 F.2d 1207 (5th Cir. 1979).
159. The Court concluded in Bell, supra note 153, that counsel's failure to object to admis-
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proposition, even when the accused has the benefit of counsel.
V.
The federal judicial system depends upon lower court compli-
ance with decisions rendered by higher courts.160 An appellate court
needs to apply the decisions of the Supreme Court in the cases it
decides' 6 and state courts need to apply Supreme Court decisions to
the federal questions raised before it.162  Failure of state courts to
apply federal constitutional principles to issues raised in state pro-
ceedings163 jeopardizes the structural integrity of the system. It un-
dermines the binding effect of decisions of the highest court. 164
sion of oral statements alleged to have been made by the accused, while in custody at the time
the statements were offered, waived any error in trial court's refusal to order the State to dis-
close the statements prior to trial. An issue regarding the accused's competence, based on his
alleged retardation, was also not properly preserved for appellate review due to a failure by
counsel to object to the court's charge or request a special instruction. To the extent that the
accused in Bell was denied reversal on any one of the grounds discussed above, simply because
of a failure of counsel, one might examine the propriety of penalizing the accused for the
errors of his lawyer. If we are not to assume that any such error renders the representation
incompetent, then clearly trial judges must assume greater responsibility for controlling trials
and ensuring that the rights of criminal defendants are not subject to infringement.
160. In Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, I Wheat. 304 (1816), the Supreme Court held, in a
Virginia case, that it had power to exercise appellate jurisdiction over state courts whenever
cases pending or decided in such courts come within the scope of the judicial power of the
United States. Thus holding, the Court effectively established the role of federalism in judicial
matters.
161. Weber v. Kaiser Aluminum and Chemical Corporation, 611 F.2d 132 (5th Cir. 1980),
opinion of Gee, J., on remand from the Supreme Court:
For myself only, and with all respect and deference, I here note my personal
conviction that the decision of the Supreme Court in this case is profoundly
wrong ....
Subordinate magistrates such as I must either obey the orders of higher author-
ity or yield up their posts to those who will. I obey, since in my view the action
required of me by the Court's mandate is only to follow a mistaken course and not an
evil one.
162. White v. State, 543 S.W.2d 366, 369 (Tex. Crim. App. 1976), on remand from the
Supreme Court.
163. A concise discussion of the "incorporation" of federal constitutional guarantees in the
area of criminal law and procedure into the guarantee of due process of law contained in the
Fourteenth Amendment-thereby imposing those guarantees on the states in their criminal
prosecutions is presented by Professor Abraham. Abraham, The Judiciary: The Supreme
Court in the Governmental Process, 53-93 (1973).
164. Failure to correctly apply a decision of the United States Supreme Court in review of
a state prosecution is demonstrated by the Court's decision in Adams v. Texas, 448 U.S. 38
(1980). The Texas Death Penalty statute, Article 37.071, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure
and Section 19.03, Texas Penal Code, had been upheld by the Court in Jurek v. Texas, 428
U.S. 262 (1976). The Legislature had also required capital veniremen to swear under oath that
the mandatory penalty of death or life imprisonment would not "affect his deliberations on
any issue."
Texas trial courts used the provision of Section 12.3 l(b), Texas Penal Code, requiring the
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Once a decision is rendered by the Supreme Court or by lower
federal courts exercising jurisdiction in a state, a state court deciding
the same case or considering the same issue should apply the appro-
priate rule to the extent that the federal decision precludes alterna-
tive disposition options.
65
The disposition and opinions rendered in Craven v. State 166 rep-
resent the difficulty appellants may experience in attempting to use
federal authority in the Court of Criminal Appeals. Appellant Cra-
ven initially pleaded guilty to a charge of burglary 67 and was placed
on probation. Subsequently, the states successfully moved to revoke
his probation. He appealed from the trial court decision. The bur-
glary indictment to which he initially pleaded guilty alleged that he
committed the offense by entering a building not open to the public
without the effective consent of the owner and "did then and there
commit theft."'
' 68
The Appellant signed a judicial confession admitting the offense
which was offered into evidence in support of the plea of guilty. A
oath to exclude jurors who stated that they would give truthful answers to the special issues set
forth by Article 37.071 and would not alter their vote on guilt or innocence, based upon reser-
vations about the death penalty. Such jurors would have been qualified for service on capital
juries under the standard established by the Supreme Court in Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391
U.S. 510 (1968). The Court of Criminal Appeals had consistently affirmed capital convictions
in which Witherspoon qualified jurors were excluded because they could not swear that they
would not be affected in their deliberations by the mandatory punishment scheme.
In Adams the Supreme Court reversed the affirmance by the Court of Criminal Appeals,
holding that the statute itself was not unconstitutional on its face, but must be applied consis-
tent with the rule of Witherspoon. The Adams decision has resulted in numerous reconsidera-
tions of death penalty cases characterized by the same defect, resulting in reversals. "For the
third time since a U.S. Supreme Court ruling criticized the method ofjury selection by Dallas
prosecutors in capital murder trials, a Dallas man sentenced to death by a local jury has won a
new trial," Dallas Time Herald, "Third Dallas man sentenced to death wins new trial," No-
vember 26, 1980, p. 4-C.
165. "Another fact of the judicial process that invites noncompliance (with Supreme Court
decisions) in certain instances is that in the case of state, rather than in federal, courts, the
United States Supreme Court has no power to make afinal determination of any cases in which
it reviews judgments of state courts. All it can do here is to decide the federal issue involved
and remand the case to the state court below, usually its higher appellate court, for a final
adjudication not inconsistent with its opinion. Since the state courts may then raise new issues
on remand, it is not terribly difficult, if the desire exists, to alter "legally" or even evade the
substantive intent of a United States Supreme Court decision." Abraham, supra note 2, at 4.
166. Craven v. State, 607 S.W.2d 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), motion for rehearing en bane
overruled, with three judges dissenting, herein after referred to as Craven, panel, and Craven,
en bane, respectively.
167. Section 30.02 of the Texas Penal Code, provides, in pertinent part:
(a) A person commits an offense if, without the effective consent of the owner, he:
(1) enters a habitation, or a building (or any portion of a building) not then
open to the public, with intent to commit a felony or theft. ...
168. Id.
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judicial confession is required by Article 1.15, Texas Code of Crimi-
n~tl Procedure. The Code provides that a plea of guilty before the
court must be supported by evidence.' 69 At the hearing on revoca-
tion of probation counsel objected to the proceedings on the ground
that the judicial confession, which admitted only that Appellant en-
tered a building "with intent to commit theft," was insufficient to
support the allegations in the indictment and, thus, that the convic-
tion rested on insufficient evidence. 7 ' Relying on Whitlow v.
State,' Appellant Craven contended that evidence of burglary with
intent to commit theft could not support a conviction for a burglary
in which a completed theft was alleged in the charging instrument. 72
On appeal, a panel composed of Judges Roberts, Tom Davis
and W.C. Davis affirmed the revocation by per curiam decision. t73
169. Article 1.15, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure, provides:
No person can be convicted of a felony except upon the verdict of a jury duly
rendered and recorded, unless in felony cases less than capital, the defendant, upon
entering a plea, has in open court in person waived his right of trial by jury in writing
* . provided, however, that it shall be necessary for the state to introduce evidence
into the record showing the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted
by the court as the basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be
convicted upon his plea without sufficient evidence to support the same. The evi-
dence may be stipulated if the defendant in such case consents in writing, in open
court, to waive the appearance, confrontation and cross-examination of witnesses,
and further consents either to an oral stipulation of the evidence and testimony or to
the introduction of testimony by affidavits, written statements of witnesses, and any
other documentary evidence in support of the judgment of the court ...
170. Such review has been held unavailable in Rincon v. State, 615 S.W.2d 527 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1980).
171. Whitlow v. State, 567 S.W.2d 522 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978). In Whitlow, the Court had
found fundamental error in the charge of the trial court, which authorized the jury to convict if
it found that the accused had entered the structure with intent to commit theft. The indictment
had charged that he entered and did then and there commit theft. The charge authorized
conviction on a theory of the offense different from that charged, and one which have required
a less strenuous burden of proof.
172. Craven carried the Whitlow logic one step further, alleging that the confession's ad-
mission of an intent to commit theft would not satisfy the language of the indictment, which
had pleaded that he did commit theft. On appeal, the appellant contended that there was no
evidence in the record to support the allegation that he had, in fact, committed a theft.
173. Craven, panel. The panel relied on the decision issued in Dinnery v. State, 592
S.W.2d 343 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980), in which the Court had affirmed a conviction, en banc, in
which the accused had argued the same variance between the indictment and judicial confes-
sion raised by the appellant in Craven. Significantly, however, the Dinnery record had also
shown that the accused affirmed that he was pleading guilty to the indictment and the allega-
tions contained therein. An affirmative admission by the defendant that the allegations in the
indictment are true, Adam v. State, 490 S.W.2d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Miles v. State, 486
S.W.2d 326 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972), or an admission of each element of the offense charged
while testifying, Spruell v. State, 491 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973), had previously been
held sufficient to satisfy the statutory requirements for evidence supporting the plea of guilty.
In Craven, no admissions of either type appeared in the record of the proceedings at the time
he entered his plea of guilty to the burglary indictment.
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The panel concluded that Texas law has traditionally not permitted
collateral attack on a final conviction based on insufficiency of evi-
dence. 74 However, the panel did note that other decisions had per-
mitted collateral attack where the point raised alleged "no evidence"
supporting the conviction.
175
Prior to the panel opinion in Craven the Supreme Court had
ruled in Jackson v. Virginia176 that the "no evidence" standard of
review was constitutionally impermissible. The Court held that the
proper standard for review of criminal convictions is whether the
evidence is sufficient to establish guilt beyond a reasonable doubt
when viewed from the perspective of a rational trier of fact. 177 The
requirement demands that all elements of an offense be subjected to
this test, a standard reflected in Section 2.01, Texas Penal Code.
178
On Appellant's Motion for Rehearing En Banc, the panel deci-
sion was affirmed without written opinion. 179 Three judges of the
Court of Criminal Appeals, however, dissented. Judge Clinton,
joined by Presiding Judge Onion, attacked the majority reasoning on
the ground that the panel opinion contravened the clear intent of
Article 1.15, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.1 0 Judge Roberts, a
member of the panel issuing theper curiam affirmance, dissented on
174. Craven, panel, citing Traylor v. State, 561 S.W.2d 492 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
175. Ex parte Moffett, 542 S.W.2d 184 (rex. Crim. App. 1976), involved a successful collat-
eral attack based on a claim of "no evidence." Since Appellant Craven had offered a judicial
confession, the Panel concluded that the case did not involve "no evidence," but actually
raised a question of insufficient evidence.
176. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
177. Id
178. Section 2.01, Texas Penal Code, provides:
All persons are presumed to be innocent and no person may be convicted of an
offense unless each element of the offense is proved beyond a reasonable doubt. The
fact that he has been arrested, confined, or indicted for, or otherwise charged with,
the offense gives rise to no inference of guilt at his trial.
179. Craven, en bane.
180. [W]hat the panel and, by overruling the motion for rehearing, now the Court are
doing is extending the Dinnery notion of a 'judicial confession.' Here is the germane
testimony, appellant being questioned by his own attorney:
Q: You are the same Lemuil H. Craven as charged in this cause, is that
right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Is that a cause that lists an offense on January the 15th, 1975, is that
right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q. And you are pleading guilty to that Indictment?
A. Yes sir.
By calling this brief exchange a 'judicial confession' the Court puts its imprima-
tur on a permit finally to demolish Article 1.15, V.A.C.C.P ..... To the demise of
Article 1.15, supra, and its intended protections, I dissent.
Craven, en banc (Clinton, J., dissenting).
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the ground that the judicial confession and attendant examination of
appellant at the time he entered his plea were insufficient to sustain
his conviction.' 8' He concluded that he would vote to reverse the
conviction. 1
8 2
Craven points up two distinct features of the federal judicial sys-
tem. First, Texas law differs markedly from federal law in requiring
that conviction upon guilty plea be supported by evidence sufficient
to establish guilt. 83 Had the statute not mandated such supporting
evidence, no issue of law would have been raised by the appeal since
the plea of guilty itself would probably have passed constitutional
muster.18 4  The dissenting judges, of course, expressed their collec-
tive and individual reservations about the implications of the deci-
sion for continued viability of the requirement of Article 1.15.185
Yet, no issue of inherent fairness is raised by the evidentiary require-
ment; a voluntarily offered plea and knowing and intelligent waiver
of jury trial would seem adequate to fully protect an individual's
rights without insistence that the plea be supported by independent
evidence.1
8 6
Second, the case demonstrates the difficulty encountered when
an individual asks a state appellate court to apply federal constitu-
tional principles in his behalf. In neither the panel nor en banc deci-
sions was Jackson v. Virginia18 7 cited or discussed, despite the fact
that appellant expressly relied on the decision in his motion for re-
hearing. 8 8 Since the majority en bane decision is not a written opin-
181. Craven, en banc (Roberts, J., dissenting). Judge Roberts noted that the panel had
relied on the opinion in Dinnery, supra note 11, and concluded that the reliance was improper
since unlike Dinnery, Craven had not testified that the allegations in the indictment were true
and correct. In the absence of testimony that the allegations were true and correct, Judge
Roberts argued, the evidence was insufficient, citing Drain v. State, 465 S.W.2d 939 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1971).
182. Ibid
183. Thornton v. State, 601 S.W.2d 340 (Tex. Crim. App. 1980).
184. Even though a plea of guilty in a federal action need not be supported by evidence
independent of the plea, procedural guidelines do mandate action by the trial court which will
ensure that a plea of guilty is made knowingly and voluntarily. Thus, the trial court must
explain to the defendant the nature of the charge, for example. United States v. Benavides,
596 F.2d 137, (5th Cir. 1979).
185. Craven, en banc (Clinton, J., dissenting) (Onion, P.J., joins dissenting).
186. However, the evidentiary requirement may serve the important function of notifying
the accused of the exact nature of the charge. Pleas of guilty in state prosecutions are subject
to review to determine if an accused has been properly advised concerning the nature of the
accusation and the consequence of his plea. Henderson v. Morgan, 426 U.S. 637 (1976).
187. 443 U.S. 307 (1979).
188. During oral argument before the panel, Judge Roberts inquired of counsel's familiar-
ity with the then-quite recent decision in Jackson v. Virginia.
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ion, it appears that the panel opinion expresses the opinion of a
majority of the members of the court, despite the fact that the panel
opinions rests on a statement of law contrary to that expressly af-
firmed in Jackson. Federal review is virtually precluded, however,
because an alternative theory for affirmance exists in the panel opin-
ion: that the evidence was sufficient, under Texas law, to support the
conviction. 18 9 Thus, since the requirement that guilty pleas be sup-
ported by evidence is purely a creature of state legislative action, the
court's action in Craven would appear to eliminate further appeal in
the federal system based on the court's apparent reliance on the "no
evidence" rule.190
The court's reluctance to apply the clear mandate of Jackson v.
Virginia to Texas prosecutions is not confined to the silence which
marks the Craven opinion. In Exparte Easter,'91 the petitioner at-
tacked his conviction by a jury collaterally, raising insufficient evi-
dence as his ground for relief. The court held that a conviction could
not be collaterally attacked based on insufficient evidence, basing its
ruling in part on the traditional Texas rule prohibiting such collat-
eral attack. 192 Jackson, by holding that an accused is entitled to at-
tack a conviction not supported by sufficient evidence as a matter of
constitutional right, would appear to require that the collateral at-
tack be heard in order to determine if the accused is being subjected
to jeopardy by a constitutionally defective conviction. Nevertheless,
in Easter, the court apparently chose to disregard the obvious impli-
cation of Jackson and rely on less favorable Texas law.
189. Ashwander v. Tennessee Valley Authority, 297 U.S. 288, 345-348 (1936) (Brandeis, J.,
concurring).
190. The conclusion reached by the panel, apart from its consideration of the sufficiency of
Appellant Craven's judicial confession, might have still provided a basis for federal review in
light of Jackson v. Virginia.
191. Ex parte Easter, 615 S.W.2d 718 (rex. Crim. App. 1981).
192. Craven, en banc. Implicit in Judge Roberts' dissent, however, is the conclusion that
insufficient evidence may be the basis for collateral attack, since he would have reversed the
revocation of probation, based on the attack of the underlying felony conviction.
Thus, in Oalloway v. State, 578 S.W.2d 142 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979), the Court concluded
that only some collateral attacks upon prior convictions alleged in enhancement paragraphs
would be permissible in the trial on the merits. Where the indictment alleging the offense
upon which a prior conviction was obtained was fatally defective, the conviction could be
attacked since the conviction was rendered void by the fundamentally defective charging in-
strument. This rule was applied in Ex parte Stewart, 582 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
However, the Galloway Court delined to permit collateral attack based upon insufficient evi-
dence supporting the conviction alleged in the enhancement paragraph. This type of infirmity
was deemed to be of a lesser nature by the Court, a surprising conclusion in light of Burks v.
United States, 439 U.S. 1 (1978), requiring reversal on such a ground to result in acquittal and
bar to further prosecution.
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Refusal of the Court of Criminal Appeals to apply principles of
federal constitutional law in its review of state convictions poses seri-
ous problems for litigants. First, because alternative grounds for the
decision may be given in any appellate opinion, federal relief may
never prove available despite apparent non-compliance with federal
constitutional rules governing criminal prosecutions. Second, even
when federal relief may be theoretically available, financial con-
straints may preclude application for federal relief, particularly since
no provision of the Code of Criminal Procedure authorizes payment
for counsel pursuing the interests of indigent prisoners in the federal
courts.'93 Third, where rights secured to an accused are the products
of state law, the applicant may experience frustration in trying to
persuade federal courts to implement those rights where concomitant
federal sources of the right do not exist.' 94
VI.
An appellate court frustrates both the role of defense counsel,
and the expectations of litigants, when it creates an insurmountable
or overwhelming burden of proof for the appellant challenging a rul-
ing which rests on evaluation of the factual state of the record.
While it is often said that issues of fact decided by a jury are not to
be disturbed by a reviewing court, 95 other factual issues which ap-
193. Texas law, pursuant to the decisions of the Supreme Court in Gideon v. Wainwright,
372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972), provides for court-ap-
pointed attorneys to represent indigent defendants. Article 26.05, Texas Code of Criminal
Procedure, establishes the right of court-appointed counsel to payment from the general fund
of the county in which the prosecution is had or habeas corpus hearing held, in the following
amounts: (a) a minimum payment of $50 for each day in court representing an indigent de-
fendant charged with felony or misdemeanor punishable by imprisonment, or fraction thereof;
(b) a minimum payment of $50 for each day, or fraction thereof, spent by counsel representing
an indigent in a habeas corpus action; (c) a minimum fee of $350 for prosecution to final
conclusion of an appeal to the Court of Criminal Appeals. Higher minimum payment
amounts are set out in the statute for representation in capital cases. The Article makes no
provision, however, for payment for representation of an indigent in an appeal to the United
States Supreme Court or in federal habeas actions.
194. In Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979), considerable discussion is given the prob-
able effect of the .ackson decision upon review of state court convictions in federal courts in
the dissenting opinion of Stevens, J. Justice Stevens warned of an overwhelming workload as
a result of an increase in habeas petitions raising issues of insufficient evidence. To the extent
that state appellate courts fail to implement the Jackson decision, the threat would appear far
more credible. The majority had answered the dissenters' contention by noting that most state
convictions would have been properly examined for sufficiency errors in the state appellate
courts.
195. For example, Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 38.04 (Vernon 1977), mandates:
The jury, in all cases, is the exclusive judge of the facts proved, and of the weight
to be given to the testimony, except where it is provided by law that proof of any
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pear in the record may be subject to review and thereby form the
basis for reversal. Even the traditional reluctance to review jury
questions has eroded with the increased significance of evidentiary
sufficiency in Supreme Court decisions. 196
Richardson v. State, 97 a case involving whether an accused was
represented by counsel in a prior proceeding resulting in conviction,
illustrates the type of factual issue which is often presented for appel-
late review.198 Richardson was convicted of the burglary of a build-
ing. This is a second degree felony' 99 carrying a maximum
punishment of 20 years confinement in the Texas Department of
Corrections."°° His punishment was enhanced under the Texas ha-
bitual criminal statute,2 0 1 however, by allegations that he had twice
previously been convicted of felony offenses. The statutory penalty
of life imprisonment was imposed when evidence apparently sup-
ported the allegations in the enhancement paragraphs.
particular fact is to be taken as either conclusive or presumptive proof of the exist-
ence of another fact, or where the law directs that a certain degree of weight is to be
attached to a certain species of evidence.
Thus, fact issues are to be construed in the light most favorable for support of the jury's ver-
dict. Little v. State, 567 S.W.2d 502 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978); Seaton v. State, 564 S.W.2d 721
(Tex. Crim. App. 1978). The same deference to factual determinations made at the trial court
level is applied when the court sits as trier of fact, such as in revocation of probation proceed-
ings. Grant v. State, 566 S.W.2d 954 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978).
196. In a true sense, review of sufficiency of evidence claims does not involve the making
of factual determinations from the record. Rather, the reviewing court must apply the evi-
dence in the light most favorable to the State, Williams v. State, 567 S.W.2d 507 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1978), and then evaluate the evidence in light of the legal requirements for conviction. In
Exparte Long, 564 S.W.2d 760 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), the Court held that it was not bound
by the findings of facts and conclusions of law issued by a trial court in denying habeas relief.
Generally, however, it can be said that the Court will simply apply facts found in the trial
court, it not being a proper forum for the initial fact-finding process, and evaluate disputes
over issues of law in light of the facts found in the court below. Sinegal v. State, 582 S.W.2d
135 (Tex. Crim. App. 1979).
197. Richardson v. State, No. 56,089 (rex. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 1979). Appellant's motion
for leave to file motion for rehearing, en banc, was denied and the cause is now pending on
application for federal writ of habeas corpus in the Northern District of Texas.
198. In Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) and Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25
(1972), the Supreme Court had held that an indigent criminal defendant was entitled to have
counsel provided by the state for his representation in a case which could result in
imprisonment.
Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 26.04 (Vernon 1977) provides that counsel shall be ap-
pointed to represent indigent criminal defendants in Texas trial courts.
199. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02 (Vernon 1974) defines the offense of burglary of a
building.
200. Burglary of a building is a second degree felony, Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.02(c)
(Vernon 1974), punishable by imprisonment for two to twenty years. Section 12.33, Texas
Penal Code.
201. Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(d) (Vernon 1974).
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In his motion for new trial20 2 Richardson alleged that the first
prior conviction used for enhancement was void because he was not
represented by counsel. The record reflected,20 3 however, that he
had been represented by an attorney, "Don Alexander," on the date
he entered a plea of guilty to an indictment charging the equivalent
of unauthorized use of a motor vehicle. Despite the form recitation
that he had been represented by counsel, Richardson testified that he
had no attorney at the time he entered his plea of guilty. This testi-
mony was insufficient, however, to rebut the presumption accorded
the recitals in the judgment by a consistent line of decisions by the
Court of Criminal Appeals.
2 4
Appellant's counsel did not rely exclusively on his client's testi-
mony. He developed a far more comprehensive record regarding the
circumstances of the challenged conviction. First, he called the at-
torney who had allegedly represented Richardson in the case who
testified he had no recollection of representing the Appellant;20 5 had
no record of file reflecting such representation;20 6 the signature in the
court's record purporting to be his was not20 7 and on the date when
he allegedly had represented appellant he had only been licensed to
practice law for nine days;208 and finally, that after being licensed, he
had worked for some time selling clothes in order to pay debts in-
curred in attending law school.
20 9
Second, counsel subpoenaed records of the State Bar of Texas
which showed that only one "Don Alexander" was licensed to prac-
tice in the state on the date in question.2 10 Third, the subpoenaed
records of the Dallas County Auditor's Office were introduced to
show that no fee was paid to the attorney for representation on the
date of the plea of guilty in the case t.2 1 Fourth, counsel offered the
affidavit of the complaining witness in the case which stated that had
he been approached by counsel investigating the case he would have
declined to prosecute.21 2
202. A motion for new trial on this ground could be made pursuant to Tex. Code Crim.
Pro. Ann. art. 40.03(2) (Vernon 1977).
203. Richardson, supra note 3, p.5.
204. Reeves v. State, 500 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973); Chancy v. State, 614 S.W.2d
446 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981).
205. Brief for Appellant, pp. 16-17.




210. Id, at 18.
211. Id
212. Id
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A panel of the court composed of Judges Douglas, Roberts and
Davis rejected appellant's claim that the prior conviction used to en-
hance his punishment was void because he had been deprived of
assistance of counsel.21 3
Since the Supreme Court's decision in Gideon v. Wainwright,21 4
requiring the states to provide counsel to indigent criminal defend-
ants, uncounseled convictions have been subject to collateral attack
as void.21 5 A favorable disposition of appellant's appeal would have
resulted in a new trial and maximum potential'punishment range of
five to 99 years or life, set at the discretion of the jury or trial court,
rather than the mandatory life sentence originally imposed.216
The court's disposition in Richardson reflects a posture of total
rigidity toward the resolution of factual disputes that affect impor-
tant constitutional issues. While the regularity of judgments un-
doubtedly can be presumed in most cases, the court should be
sensitive to the possibility that recitations in form judgments will not
always accurately reflect the facts. Given the exhaustive record pro-
duced in support of Richardson's testimony that he did not have an
attorney at the time of his guilty plea some twenty years before, the
court could hardly have concluded that the only basis for the issue of
fact was the self-serving testimony of the accused interested in sup-
pressing his prior record and avoiding enhancement of punishment.
In this case, other evidence supports his claim and indicates that his
testimony is not the product of fabrication. Despite this, the court
failed to look past the recitations in the form judgment.
The record developed by appellant's counsel should have con-
stituted a model for collateral attack on judgment allegedly contain-
ing inaccurate recitals. The court's position in this case can be
compared with other situations in which it has dealt with form docu-
ments which purport to incorporate all material statements of fact
later attacked.
Two specific examples of attacks on form recitals in judgments
213. Richardson, supra note 3, at 5.
214. 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
215. A conviction which is obtained when the accused is indigent, and the state fails to
afford him counsel, is constitutionally defective and cannot be used for enhancement of pun-
ishment in subsequent proceedings. Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109 (1967). This rule has
previously been applied by the Court of Criminal Appeals in Exparte Martinez, 508 S.W.2d
359 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974) and Exparte Swinney, 499 S.W.2d 101 (Tex. Crim. App. 1973).
216. Under Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.42(b) (Vernon 1974), a defendant convicted of a
second degree felony who has previously been convicted of a felony grade offense, the punish-
ment shall be as for a first degree felony. First degree felony punishment range is five years to
99 years, or life, imprisonment. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 12.32 (Vernon 1974).
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demonstrate the direction the court has apparently taken in review-
ing attacks based on conflict over facts. First, the court traditionally
followed a firm policy requiring the state to waive trial by jury in
writing when an accused enters his plea to the trial court.21 7 The
traditional rule is in accord with the statutory requirement that the
conviction was void unless the state waived jury trial in these cases
in writing.218 This requirement appears designed to prevent the pub-
lic's interest in jury trials of felony cases from being waived without
the consent of the state's attorney. In Exparte Collier,21 9 the court
apparently overruled those decisions which had previously granted
relief when the state's attorney failed to execute the waiver of jury
trial.
Even prior to the ruling in Collier, however, the court avoided
reversals by simply relying on the recitations in the judgment which
related that jury trial had been waived by the attorney for the state in
writing. In Handsbur v. State,220 for example, a panel composed of
Presiding Judge Onion and Judges Douglas and Davis rejected ap-
pellant's claim that his conviction was void because the form docu-
ment lacked the signature of the prosecutor. Appellant had pleaded
guilty to burglary, waiving jury trial, and was assessed a probated
sentence. He appealed from the revocation of probation, alleging
the failure of the state's attorney to execute the form waiver voided
his conviction and the subsequent proceedings. The panel held that,
because the form judgment recited that the waiver had been exe-
cuted and no objection was offered at the time appellant originally
entered his plea of guilty, the recitals in the judgment were entitled
to the presumption of regularity. The panel did not address the fac-
217. Exparte Foster, 283 S.W.2d 761,762 (Tex. Crim. App. 1955) (the requirement for the
State's written consent is "mandatory and requisite to a valid judgment."); Expare Dooley,
246 S.W.2d 631 (rex. Crim. App. 1952); Thompson v. State, 226 S.W.2d 872 (rex. Crim. App.
1950); Exparle Marzulla, 343 S.W.2d 701 (rex. Crim. App. 1961).
218. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1977) provides in pertinent part:
The defendant in a criminal prosecution for any offense classified as a felony less
than capital shall have the right, upon entering a plea, to waive the right of trial by
jury, conditioned, however, that such waiver must be made in person by the defend-
ant in writing in open court with the consent and approval of the court, and the
attorney representing the State. The consent and approval by the court shall be en-
tered of record on the minutes of the court, and the consent and approval of the
attorney representing the State shall be in writing, signed by him, and filed in the
papers of the cause before the defendant enters his plea....
219. Exparle Collier, 614 S.W.2d 429 (Tex. Crim. App. 1981). In Collier, the Court finally
held that, absent a showing of harm, a conviction otherwise proper would not be disturbed
merely because State failed to sign consent to jury waiver form.
220. Handsbur v. State, No. 65,977 (rex. Crim. App. December 26, 1980), per curlam
panel opinion; leave to file motion for en banc rehearing was denied.
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tual issue raised by the face of the judgment itself-that the docu-
ment did not contain a signature of the assistant district attorney
representing the state. The panel relied, instead, in prior decisions in
which the court had applied the rule that recitals in the judgment
would be entitled to the presumption of regularity, citing Waldrop v.
State."'1 In Waldrop, however, there was evidence in the record that
the waiver had been executed by the prosecutor although the docu-
ment did not appear in the record. The court relied on the trial
judge's notation that the waiver had been executed and then lost.
222
The Waldrop court concluded:
The judgment recites that this written consent and ap-
proval had been filed. There is nothing before us legally
combatting the recitals of the judgment.223
In Handsbur there was no issue of lost waiver. The form judgment
upon which the court relied was included in the record and was
before the panel. To suggest that a signature is present simply be-
cause a pre-printed form document recites it to be so, is hardly de-
fensible when the form is available for the court's scrutiny and no
signature appears on the document.224
One could hardly argue that appellant Handsbur was prejudiced
because the state's attorney failed to execute a waiver of jury trial.225
Yet, the implications of the reasoning applied in that case spill over
into cases in which the potential for prejudice is readily apparent, as
in Richardson. Judge Davidson pointed out this deficiency in rea-
soning in his dissenting opinion in Exparte Johnson ,226 another case
221. Waldrop v. State, 83 S.W.2d 974, 976 (rex. Crim. App. 1935). There, the trial court
had conducted a hearing based on the claim of omission by the prosecutor. The trial court
noted ihat all parties had represented to the court that the necessary papers had been signed,
and that the court could simply not certify whether the waiver had been "lost, misplaced, or
destroyed, or never filed." The Court of Criminal Appeals held that this finding supported the
presumption of the judgment recital that the waiver had been signed and filed.
222. Id
223. Id, at 975-976.
224. Gonzales v. State, 508 S.W.2d 388 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974). The Court relied on the
judgment recital which included the notation that the court had accepted the executed waiver
by the State.
225. Collier, supra note 26, requires a showing of harm if the judgment is collaterally at-
tacked. The Court distinguished the standard for collateral attack from the standard applied
on direct appeal in Lawrence v. State, 626 S.W.2d 56 (rex. Crim. App. 1981). On direct ap-
peal from conviction, the accused is not required to demonstrate harm to gain reversal, appar-
ently reflecting a change in law from the court's previous rule that lack of a signed waiver to
jury trial by the State renders a conviction void.
226. Exparte Johnson, 296 S.W.2d 239 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956), dissenting opinion of Da-
vidson, J. Judge Davidson's reservations about the intellectual dishonesty engaged in by the
Court in affirming, by overlooking the lack of an executed consent, foreshadows the far more
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involving the state's failure to execute a waiver of jury trial. Judge
Davidson argued that reliance on recitals in the form judgment or
any form document in the record, when in conflict with a controlling
document in the record, places form above substance.
Curiously, the court flirted with the reverse position for some
time in dealing with the issue of form waivers of counsel227 executed
by indigent defendants. The court adopted the position that execu-
tion of a form waiver of counsel was inadequate either to preserve
the right to counsel, or demonstrate a knowing and intelligent waiver
of counsel, absent a showing that the accused understood the impli-
cations of the waiver. Thus, the court gave effect to the traditional
suspicion of waivers of counsel expressed by the Supreme Court in
Johnson v. Zerbst.228 In Barbour v. State,229 for instance, the court
held that the record must reflect that the accused was made aware of
the disadvantages of self-representation if the waiver is to be given
effect.
As might have been expected, the court has tempered the posi-
tion taken in Barbour and decisions like Lisney v. State,230 where the
court had expressly required a showing in the record that the ac-
cused understood the significance of the waiver. In Johnson v.
State,231 the court limited the application of its rule on the validity
of waivers of counsel, thereby overruling Lisney. Under the Johnson
formulation, the rule of Lisney and Barbour is only applicable in
cases in which the accused actually attempts to contest his guilt.
232
reasonable posture taken by the Court in finally overruling its prior decisions in Collier, supra
note 20.
227. Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 1.14 (Vernon 1977) provides that the accused may
waive any right secured to "him by law except the right of trial by jury in a capital felony
case." However, the current reading of Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1977),
precludes waiver of a trial by jury unless the accused is represented by counsel, if necessary,
appointed counsel.
228. Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458 (1938).
229. Barbour v. State, 551 S.W.2d 371 (Tex. Crim. App. 1977).
230. Lisney v. State, 574 S.W.2d 144 (Tex. Crim. App. 1978), overruled by Johnson, Ibtd
The Court had applied the Lisney rationale in Thomas v. State. 550 S.W.2d 64 (Tex. Crim.
App. 1977) and Webb v. State, 533 S.W.2d 780 (rex. Crim. App. 1976).
231. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116 (rex. Crim. App. 1981).
232. In adopting the new position, the Court applied the concept of self-representation, as
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), only to situa-
tions in which the accused actually contests the charges. The Johnson formulation applies to
misdemeanor cases since felony prosecutions will likely still be controlled by Tex. Code Crim.
Pro. Ann. art. 1.13 (Vernon 1977). Despite the less serious potential for lengthy incarceration
which attends misdemeanor prosecutions, it would be difficult to imagine a more critical deci-
sion than the one made when an accused must decide whether to contest the charges and
demand trial. Under Johnson, the Court virtually presumes that a defendant may make that
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Thus, in cases in which the accused enters a plea of guilty, the form
waiver will be given effect, precluding the accused from attempting
to attack his conviction by contesting the validity of the waiver. One
might argue that the court's reasoning, though initially appearing
sound, misses the point, since the decision to waive trial and plead
guilty is generally considered to be the singularly most significant
decision an accused makes.
Johnson does leave intact the court's distrust of the form waiver
in cases in which an accused persists in a plea of innocence and at-
tempts to represent himself.233 However, the court's retraction from
the posture of Barbour and Lisney suggests that the court is unwill-
ing to abandon the luxury of relying on form documents in assessing
waivers of both important constitutional rights, and statutory guar-
antees of minimal significance to defendants, such as the require-
ment that the state waive jury trial.
Every waiver of counsel cannot be condemned simply because it
is documented by a form reciting the elements of waiver. Nor can
the court's reasoning rejecting reversal as a proper remedy when the
state fails to execute a jury trial waiver be reasonably assailed as an
infringement on the concept of fair trial.23 4 However, the ease with
which an appellate court can substitute reliance on form documents
to preclude inquiry into important issues of law or fact is more dan-
gerous when the court chooses to rely on forms in spite of the type of
record developed by the appellant in Richardson. The form over
substance approach demonstrated by the Richardson court gives the
accused virtually no opportunity to overcome the presumption of
regularity of pre-printed form documents.235
decision without benefit of advice of counsel, concluding that presence of counsel is mandated
only by the requirements of trial.
233. The Court does conclude in Johnson, supra, note 39, that the form waiver of counsel
will be viewed with suspicion if the waiver precedes a contested decision. However, as noted
in the preceding paragraph, the exercise of the right to contest guilt itself does not, in the
Court's eyes, require advice of counsel.
234. Both lines of decision taken by the Court will have greatest impact in precluding
successful attack on convictions obtained upon pleas of guilty. Were safeguards adequate to
guarantee that all such convictions were based only upon knowing and intelligent pleas, and
that all legal rights of the accused were properly preserved, the Court's direction might be
laudable simply in light of the need to control appellate backlog. This goal would be in line
with the Legislature's expressed intent in restricting appeals from conviction obtained on guilty
pleas in cases in which a negotiated plea bargaining agreement was accepted by the trial court.
Tex. Code Crim. Pro. Ann. art. 44.02 (Vernon 1977) limits the right of appeal when the trial
court imposes punishment not in excess of that agreed upon in the plea bargaining agreement.
235. One might question what additional evidence Appellant Richardson could have con-
ceivably offered to discharge his burden of overcoming the presumptive validity of the recitals
in the form judgment.
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Richardson demonstrates, as well, that justice is not available in
the appellate process when a court established a burden of persua-
sion which is unreasonable. Even the court would have to admit that
it has established its preference for pre-printed form documents over
fully developed records by this type of ruling.2 36 In taking this posi-
tion the court displays an insensitivity to well-reasoned, documented
challenges which should trigger closer appellate scrutiny.
CONCLUSION
The foregoing discussions demonstrate how an appellate court
may fail to discharge its duties in compliance with established princi-
ples of judicial behavior,1 7 frustrating efforts of defense counsel to
properly assess the significance of decisions. The consequences of
appellate court failure do not simply fall on the legal profession.238
The public at large will ultimately suffer if appellate decision-mak-
ing is unprincipled. The community's loss of confidence in appellate
courts may result from practicing attorneys loss of confidence in the
system of appellate decision-making. The practical impact of the
loss is that attorneys may no longer trust their own judgment in ad-
236. Mulchahey, supra note 16, suggests that it is not only the recitals in the judgment that
are given great weight, but the mere fact of conviction will ultimately come to carry with it a
presumption of regularity with respect to protection of the rights of the accused. The concept
of the record itself, loses validity where pre-printed forms satisfy all requirements to establish-
ing valid convictions. A record should be required to reflect actual events, recorded at the time
they transpire, in order to fully establish that such constitutional and statutory requirements as
may be essential to valid convictions are recognized and met.
237. Professor Fuller discusses eight routes to failure of a legal system:
The first and most obvious lies in a failure to achieve rules at all, so that every
issue must be decided on an ad hoe basis. The other routes are: (2) a failure to
publicize, or at least make available to the affected party, the rules he is expected to
observe; (3) the abuse of retroactive legislation, which not only cannot itself guide
action, but undercuts the integrity of rules prospective in effect, since it puts them
under the threat of retrospective change; (4) a failure to make rules understandable;
(5) the enactment of contradictory rules or (6) rules that require conduct beyond the
powers of the affected party; (7) introducing such frequent changes in the rules that
the subject cannot orient his action by them; and, finally, (8) a failure of congruence
between the rules is announced and their actual administration.
Fuller, The Morality of Law, 39 (1969).
To the extent that the appellate court is placed in a position uniquely suited to protection
against the above failings, that court is charged with a special duty toward the citizenry to
make certain that its own conduct does not fall afoul of Professor Fuller's critical eight
guidelines.
238. "Organized, predictable procedure is of the essence to any judicial body, particularly
to the highest tribunal, for the vast majority of its work and certainly its raison d'etre is appel-
late." Abraham, The Judiciary: The Supreme Court in the Governmental Process 176 (- ed.
1977).
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vising clients. The quick overruling of precedent,239 as illustrated by
the Court of Criminal Appeals in its rulings on proof of ownership in
theft cases,240 and in the criteria applied in evaluating waivers of
counsel,241 confuse, rather than clarify the court's posture on these
matters.
Further, the political implications of the court's major shifts in
policy are likely to be viewed as a result of popular election of judges
in an emerging two-party state.242 Decisions which appear to be
"tough on crime" may be viewed as attempts to avoid defeat at the
ballot box. The general attack on judicial decision-making may also
result in the failure of the court to void legislation when necessary to
protect individual rights, as the Hufines243 opinion admits. The
dissenters in Jackson v. Virginia2 4 argued that imposition of the
"reasonable doubt" standard of review of state convictions would
overwhelm the federal district courts.245 The majority answer was
that most state cases would have been properly decided-in the state
appellate courts, thus averting the burden on federal habeas.246 Yet,
239. Consider the following passage describing the changing character of the Supreme
Court after the resignation of Chief Justice Earl Warren:
"It was unlikely that a Nixon Court would reverse all the Warren Court's decisions.
Though Justices John Harlan, Potter Stewart and Bryon White had dissented from some of the
famous Warren decisions, each of them had strong reservations on the matter of the Court's
reversing itself. They firmly believed in the doctrine of stare decisis--the principle that prece-
dent governs, that the Court is a continuing body making law that does not change abruptly
merely because Justices are replaced." Woodward and Armstrong; The Brethren, 10 (1979).
The foregoing passage illustrates the concern which attends overruling of precedent be-
cause of changing composition of an appellate court. While this concern is acute when the
Supreme Court is the subject of discussion, a similar uneasiness attends a rapid shift in legal
position by the highest court of a jurisdiction.
240. Compton v. State, 607 S.W.2d 246 (rex. Crim. App. 1980), en banc, overruling Mc-
Gee v. State, 572 S.W.2d 723 (rex. Crim. App. 1978) and Commons v. State, 575 S.W.2d 518
(rex. Crim. App. 1979), en banc.
241. Johnson v. State, 614 S.W.2d 116 (rex. Crim. App. 1981), en banc, overruling Lisney
v. State, 574 S.W.2d 144 (rex. Crim. App. 1978).
242. An illustration of the Court's sensitivity to public and legislative sentiment may be
exemplified by its treatment of death penalty cases. After the Texas death penalty statute had
been invalidated by the Supreme Court in Branch v. Texas, 408 U.S. 238 (1972), the Legisla-
ture moved to enact a new statutory scheme of capital punishment, Section 19.03, Texas Penal
Code and Article 37.071, Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. This scheme was upheld in
Jurek v. Texas, 428 U.S. 262 (1976). However, in three recent cases, decisions of the Court of
Criminal Appeals in capital cases have been reversed by the federal courts: Adams v. Texas,
448 U.S. 38 (1980); Jurek v. Estelle, 450 U.S. 1014 (1981); and Smith v. Estelle, 451 U.S. 454
(1981). Recent history suggests that the Court is content to permit federal judges to review
Texas death penalty cases for consideration of constitutional claims.
243. Exparte Huffhines, nos. 60,749-60,751 (rex. Crim. App. 1979).
244. 443 U.S. 307, dissenting opinion of Stevens, J.
245. Ibid
246. One theory advanced by some attorneys has been that the Court of Criminal Appeals
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the failure of state appellate courts to recognize and incorporate the
Jackson holding in their decision-making cannot help but inspire
further application by state prisoners for federal relief, requiring
more extensive federal intervention in state criminal procedure.
The integrity of the federal division in appellate responsibilities
can only be preserved if state courts properly apply federal constitu-
tional principles in review of state convictions.2 47 Reliance on the
integrity of state courts underlies the Supreme Court's decision in
Stone v. Powell,248 limiting review of state prisoner's Fourth Amend-
ment claims previously reviewed in the state appellate process. 249
The integrity of the Court of Criminal Appeals is not served by the
decisions in Richardson2 50 or Handsbur,25I in which the court reveals
preference for form over substance in adjudicating rights of defend-
ants. Rather than ignoring the absence of an actual signature on the
form waiver of jury trial, the Handsbur court should have simply
reversed and announced prospectively that the state's failure to exe-
cute a written waiver of jury trial would not constitute a ground of
attack absent a showing of harm to the accused.252
The undermining of the perception of judicial integrity and the
effectiveness of the criminal justice system is likely to have severe
reads Jackson to require only that afederal court reviewing a claim of insufficient evidence in
state court conviction must apply the standard announced in the Jackson decision. In this
context, the Court would not be required to apply the standard in its own review of sufficiency
questions. While this theory is tenuous, at best, it would explain an unwillingness to directly
apply Jackson and its rule to review of Texas convictions.
247. It would be unjust to leave the impression that the Court of Criminal Appeals never
reviews legislation in light of constitutional requirement. In Tamez v. State, 534 S.W.2d 686
(Tex. Crim. App. 1976), for example, the Court reversed a revocation of the appellant's proba-
tion for violation of a judicially imposed condition of probation which required the appel-
lant/probationer to submit his person and residence to search at any time. This condition was
held violative of both federal and Texas constitutions. The Court also effectively extended the
probation revocation proceedings the exclusionary rule, a minority position among American
jurisdictions at the time. See Note/Texas Developments, 4 Am.J. Crim. Law 334, 336, n.l 1
(1976).
248. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). The Court held that the remedy of federal
habeas corpus would no longer be available for review of Fourth Amendment claims brought
by petitioners convicted in state courts if a full and fair review of said claims had been afforded
on appeal from conviction in state appellate courts.
249. The Stone v. Powell, ibid, reasoning is examined critically in Note: "Criminal Proce-
dure-Habeas Corpus-A state prisoner who has had a full and fair opportunity to litigate
fourth amendment claims is not entitled to habeas corpus relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in a
Federal District Court. Stone v. Powell, - U.S. -, 96 S. Ct. (1976)," 5 Am. J. Crim. Law 90
(1977).
250. Richardson v. State, no. 56,089 (Tex. Crim. App. Feb. 14, 1979).
251. Handsbur v. State, no. 65,977 (rex. Crim. App. November 26, 1980).
252. This is eventually what the Court did in Exparle Collier, 614 S.W.2d 429 (rex. Crim.
App. 1981).
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ramifications that will affect the general public.153 The current con-
cern with inadequacies in the penal system, ranging from rioting in
the past few years in New Mexico, Michigan, Nevada, Florida, New
York and other jurisdictions to the far-sighted opinion of the district
court in Ruiz v. Estelle,254 fails to touch upon a significant factor in
the rehabilitation process. That factor involves the perception of in-
dividual defendants as to quality of justice dispensed by a given
court or system of courts.
The resilience of the United States Constitution depends, in
part, on the simplicity of its promises of protection of individual
rights.255 To the extent that the simple guarantees of the Constitu-
tion are compromised by overly complex or seemingly dishonest
opinions, an appellate court cannot elude responsibility for the con-
sequent damage to society. Although the impact is impossible to dis-
cem empirically, one must assume that an individual convicted of a
criminal offense will assess the fairness of the means by which the
253. It is often the case that reasoning employed by a court in reaching a result is attacked
on the grounds that the reliance on constitutional or statutory provision, or prior case law, is
incorrect. Thus, while a result may be just, or considered so by the commentator, the route to
the result may be subject to criticism. For instance, Professor Fuller disagrees with the route-
the Eighth Amendment--taken by the Supreme Court to invalidate a statute making narcotics
addiction criminal in Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962). Lon L. Fuller, The Morality
ofLaw 104-106 (rev. ed. 1969).
254. Ruiz v. Estelle, 666 F.2d 854 (5th Cir. 1982), affirming in part and reversing in part
503 F. Supp. 1265 (S. Dist. Tex. 1980).
255. The issue of whether the provisions of the Constitution are truly clear is open to
debate, of course, and individuals considering particular guarantees, regardless of training or
education in law, are likely to arrive at different meanings for the requirements of the docu-
ment. These may simply reflect individual concepts of fairness. Trained observers, however,
are likely to view the document as especially susceptible to interpretations. Consider the fol-
lowing comments:
"The Constitution, and particularly the Bill of Rights, is designed to protect in-
dividual citizens and groups against certain decisions that a majority of citizens might
want to make, even when that majority acts in what it takes to be the general or
common interest. Some of these constitutional restraints take the form of fairly pre-
cise rules, like the rule that requires a jury trial in federal criminal proceedings or,
perhaps, the rule that forbids the national Congress to abridge freedom of speech.
But other standards take the form of what are often called 'vague' standards, for
example, the provision that the government shall not deny men due process of law, or
equal protection of the laws." R. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously, 133 (1978).
v"What is perfectly clear is that many of provisions of the Constitution have the
quality I have described as that of being blunt and incomplete. This means that in
one way or another their meaning must be filled out." Fuller, supra, at 102.
That portions of the Constitution are "blunt and incomplete," or "vague" is hardly subject to
dispute among legal scholars. But it is less clear that large segments of the population will
share that view, as evidenced by the belief held by many that the Constitution forbids busing
for integration purposes or abortion-and that court decisions upholding such practices on
constitutional grounds are themselves violative of the document's commands.
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appellate court deals with his case.256 When the conclusion that he
hits been unfairly treated is supported by the opinion of members of
the legal profession, the individual and those familiar with his case
will lose respect for the internal integrity of the system.
The simple guarantees such as the right to jury trial, 257 the right
to confront and cross-examine witnesses, 258 the right to effective
assistance of counsel,259 the right to be free from unreasonable
search260 and the right not to be twice put in jeopardy for the same
offense,261 are rendered complex primarily by the decisions of appel-
late courts which have drawn limits-often quite necessary-to the
application of those fights. The more sophisticated the reasoning
employed in drawing the lines of limitation, the more likely the rea-
soning will be lost in translation when viewed from the position of
the uneducated layperson.262 Ultimately the response will be cast in
256. A much discussed concept in the opinions of the Supreme Court has been the internal
integrity of the criminal justice system. Thus, despite the fact that exclusion of illegally ob-
tained evidence may result in the criminal going free "because the constable has blundered,"
in the words of Justice Cardozo when a judge of the New York Court of Appeals, People v.
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, at 21 150 N.E. 585, at 587 (1926), the Court held in Mapp v. Ohio, 367
U.S. 643 (1961), that exclusion of evidence was a rule necessary to preserve the integrity of the
criminal justice system. Justice Clark, writing for the majority, observed: "Nothing can de-
stroy a government more quickly than its failure to observe its own laws, or worse, to disregard
the charter of its own existence."
He then quoted from the dissenting opinion of Justice Brandeis, issued in Olmstead v.
United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1928):
Decency, security, and liberty alike demand that governmental officials shall be
subjected to th same rules of conduct that are commands to the citizen. In a govern-
ment of laws, existence of the government will be imperiled if it fails to observe the
laws scrupulously. Our government is the potent, the omnipresent teacher. For good
or ill, it teaches the whole people by its example. Crime is contagious. If the govern-
ment becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law; it invites every man to be-
come a law until himself; it invites anarchy.
For purposes of this discussion, it is not the alleged illegal act of the State that is directly
placed in issue. Rather, of concern is the action of an appellate court in sanctioning such
conduct, tacitly, by relying on interpretative freedom in implementing constitutional protec-
tions as a means of denying relief that the literal language of the guarantees would promise.
257. U.S. CONST., amend. VI; TEX. ColsT. art. I, §§ 10, 15.
258. U.S. CONsT., amend. VI; TEx. CoNsT. art. I § 10; Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400
(1965); Washington v. Texas, 384 U.S. 14 (1967).
259. Supra, note 20.
260. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; TEX. CoNsT. art. I § 9.
261. U.S. CONsT. amend V; TEX. CONST., art. I § 14.
262. The Court's disposition of appellant's sufficiency of evidence claim in Collins v. State,
602 S.W.2d 537 (rex. Crim. App. 1980), en banc, provides classic example of this problem.
The Court declined to review the claim, which would have afforded the accused a possible
acquittal and bar to re-prosecution-as the panel opinion had done-and not only did it de-
prive the accused of this determination, but Judge Clinton further suggested that the State
might be able to bring additional evidence to a second trial. The accused, if personally aware
of the Supreme Court decisions Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978), Greene v. Massey,
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distrust of the judicial system that refuses to enforce constitutional
guarantees by resorting to concepts of waiver, failure of counsel to
preserve error and the "harmless error" rule.
Just as penal systems which reinforce antisocial behavior
through poor conditions lead to further antisocial behavior, a judi-
cial system which obscures the meaning of clear language in both the
federal and Texas constitutions breeds hostility and lack of respect.
The overriding concern of any system of law should be fairness.
By dispensing with fundamental fairness as an important concern in
decision-making and supplanting it with complex or technical ra-
tionalization, the system becomes merely a shell, and fails to achieve
the legitimate goals of the system. Increasing rates of crime will no
doubt prompt efforts to maximize penalties and limit procedural
guarantees for the criminal defendant.263 However, attention should
also be focused on the internal workings of the criminal justice sys-
tem and particularly, the courts, and the extent to which their mode
437 U.S. 19 (1978) and Hudson v. Louisiana, 450 U.S. 40 (1981), must be at best confused by
what has happened to his Double Jeopardy Clause protections in the Court of Criminal
Appeals.
263. One can look to the legislative effort expanded in the increasing range of severe penal-
ties, such as the death penalty, Section 12.3 1, Texas Penal Code, and enhancement of punish-
ments, Section 12.42, Texas Penal Code, as evidence of the Legislature's response to public
outcry for greater punishment options. This instinct is not limited to Texas, or the United
States, however. The same sentiment was expressed by Lord Denning in his argument to the
Royal Commission on Capital Punishment:
"The punishment for grave crimes should be adequately reflect the revulsion felt
by the majority of citizens for them. It is a mistake to consider the object of punish-
ment as being deterrent or reformative or preventative and nothing else. The ulti-
mate justification of any punishment is not that it is a deterrent but that it is the
emphatic denunciation by the community of a crime and from this point of view
there are some murders which in the present state of opinion demand the most em-
phatic denunciation of all, namely the death penalty." Hart, Law, Liberty andMoral-
ity, 65 (1963).
By way of comparison, consider the language of the statement of objectives of the Texas
Penal Code. Section 1.02 of the Code states:
The general purposes of this code are to establish a system of prohibitions, pen-
alties, and correctional measures to deal with conduct that unjustifiably and inexcus-
ably causes or threatens harm to those individual or public interests for which state
protection is appropriate. To this end, the provisions of this code are intended, and
shall be construed, to achieve the following objectives:
(1) to insure the public safety through:
(A) the deterrent influence of the penalties hereinafter provided;
(B) the rehabilitation of those convicted of violations of this code; and
(C) such punishment as may be necessary to prevent likely recurrence of
criminal behavior.
The Code fails to expressly state retribution as a goal of its provisions, although arguably, one
could infer a retributive sentiment expressed in subsection (c).
For an example of the Supreme Court's evaluation of a state statute implementing the
death penalty as a punishment for the type of murder noted by Lord Denning, see Godfrey v.
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
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of operation may contribute to declining respect for law should be
assessed
2 64
264. Consider the discussion given the Supreme Court's internal concern over the exclu-
sionary rule in B. Woodward and S. Armstrong, The Brethren, 129-136 (1981).
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